I am launching a new blog with my friend and analyst Scott LaFoy on the food situation in North Korea. I will continue updating this blog because I will still be writing about much more than the famine in North Korea - but for those looking for a good blog that will keep them informed about the humanitarian crisis in the DPRK, I hope you will frequent our new blog.
DPRK Food Aid Blog
Sunday, June 17, 2012
Saturday, June 2, 2012
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi speaks
After overseeing months of unprecedented reforms in her home country of Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi (hereafter abbreviated ASSK) went to Bangkok and spoke at the World Economic Forum on East Asia. Here are the highlights of her message to the leading members of the international community:
- The question of whether or not the breathtaking reforms have become irreversible in Burma/Myanmar remains the focus of policymakers and policy analysts - but this begs the fundamental question of what the nature of reforms are in Burma. ASSK defines reforms as improvements to the conditions of the Burmese peoples.
- There is the political aspect of the reforms, which has been the focus of the international community in the last few months - beyond releasing political prisoners and democratizing the electoral system, ASSK calls for national commitment so that all ethnic groups of the union can benefit from the changes. The friction between the ethnic groups are not unbridgeable.
- Paralleling the political process, ASSK noted that Burma must engage in more robust economic reforms. The opinions of the entrepreneurs in Burma are that the business climate has not significantly improved - ASSK points out that economic reforms are not held up by just fiscal and monetary measures but also by judicial and legislative reforms. Rule of law is to not only protect political activist, but also to regulate business practices. Key to achieving this will be to establish an independent judicial system to administer laws justly. And so far, reforms in the Burmese judicial system has been slow in coming.
- ASSK spoke about the critical mass of educated people (from Paul Collier) necessary to carry out changes in the country. By education ASSK refers to secondary education, not tertiary or doctoral. She believes that education will be fundamental to resolving unemployment among the youth and creating a citizenry capable of implementing the reforms. She hopes to focus on job creation and vocational training.
- According to ASSK, the biggest problem in Burma is the hopelessness born out of mass youth unemployment. Job creation therefore is both a practical necessity and one that will secure the long term well-being of the country.
- ASSK believes that the Burmese people on the ground are ready to adopt the democratic process and sees eradicating corruption and inequality as a chief assignment.
- Burma is not yet a fully fledged democracy, ASSK admits, and the reforms are still highly dependent on the commitment of the military (she calls for cautious optimism and healthy skepticism); nonetheless, it is the Burmese government's role to assist the people empower themselves by choosing their own means of self improvement. The state must simply be capable of providing the legal and technical assistance necessary.
- ASSK asks the ASEAN countries to express what they expect of Burma by the time the country takes the presidency of the organization in 2014.
Syria and Russia
As the bloodshed in Syria gets increasingly out of hand, the international community is mounting its criticism of Vladimir Putin for abetting the Assad regime in its bloody struggle to maintain power. The United States and many of the European nations have sided with the Free Syrian Army and support the removal of President Bashar Al-Assad - meanwhile, despite the Russian commitment to Kofi Annan's Plan, Moscow's firm stance against intervention prevents further action from the West.
So why is the Kremlin so wary of putting its boots down on this clear infringement of human rights by Damascus? As I noted before in my blog post and article "The Russian Winter of Discontent," Putin has two major problems with the situation at hand - First, the erosion of Russia's ability to influence events abroad - in particular, the ability to mitigate unbridled Western actions in key regions vital to Moscow's traditional foreign policy objectives; second, the inability of the US to offer anything quid pro quo for Russia's cooperation.
If President Obama wants to change the situation at hand, then he should see to altering the standing conditions on which Moscow creates its foreign policy instead of waiting for the Kremlin to budge on the status quo.
Tuesday, May 29, 2012
An Uncertain Future Together
A follow-up to the previous post (Prospects for a New Trading Bloc), I feel it is necessary to provide further analysis on the possible motives behind South Korea's acceptance of the joint declaration which underscored the possibility of forming a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA). This new position is different from the more skeptical position that South Korea took in December last year.
Looking at the timing of Seoul's negotiations with its neighbors, economic benefits from closer regional economic integration appear to be only one of the many objectives that President Lee Myungbak had under consideration. Although the finalization of the agreement between Seoul and Tokyo was recently put on hold, a bilateral agreement on sharing military intelligence and logistics was in its final stage before the trilateral negotiations began. Immediately following the summit in Beijing, South Korea approached China about establishing a similar arrangement. The timing of these meetings should be read as an expression of Seoul's foreign policy objectives.
It is likely that President Lee is attempting to achieve a definitive foreign policy victory before his term ends. The biggest challenge to Lee was not just the two North Korean attacks in 2010, but also the meek response he received from the regional powers when he sought to reprimand Pyongyang. In particular, China's lukewarm response has been blamed for encouraging North Korea to continue provocative actions along the Northern Limitation Line. Preventing future attacks will require establishing a diplomatic environment in the region that would deter North Korea from behaving belligerently - with China enthusiastic about the trilateral FTA, Seoul may be hoping to use it as leverage to more closely align Beijing to South Korea's interests.
Despite the efforts, China is unlikely to change its position on North Korea in the near future, especially when the Chinese Communist Party is preparing for its power transition later this year. Furthermore, China needs North Korea to resource the necessary raw materials for the development of the northeastern provinces.
This should also provide a stark reminder to the United States that some of South Korea's needs can only be satisfied by Chinese cooperation. Events this April proved that the United States can only do so much to convince the North Koreans not to do something. With this in mind, there is little reason to brashly pursue policy that will bring the two countries even closer together.
Please read my article on Asia Times Online
Looking at the timing of Seoul's negotiations with its neighbors, economic benefits from closer regional economic integration appear to be only one of the many objectives that President Lee Myungbak had under consideration. Although the finalization of the agreement between Seoul and Tokyo was recently put on hold, a bilateral agreement on sharing military intelligence and logistics was in its final stage before the trilateral negotiations began. Immediately following the summit in Beijing, South Korea approached China about establishing a similar arrangement. The timing of these meetings should be read as an expression of Seoul's foreign policy objectives.
It is likely that President Lee is attempting to achieve a definitive foreign policy victory before his term ends. The biggest challenge to Lee was not just the two North Korean attacks in 2010, but also the meek response he received from the regional powers when he sought to reprimand Pyongyang. In particular, China's lukewarm response has been blamed for encouraging North Korea to continue provocative actions along the Northern Limitation Line. Preventing future attacks will require establishing a diplomatic environment in the region that would deter North Korea from behaving belligerently - with China enthusiastic about the trilateral FTA, Seoul may be hoping to use it as leverage to more closely align Beijing to South Korea's interests.
Despite the efforts, China is unlikely to change its position on North Korea in the near future, especially when the Chinese Communist Party is preparing for its power transition later this year. Furthermore, China needs North Korea to resource the necessary raw materials for the development of the northeastern provinces.
This should also provide a stark reminder to the United States that some of South Korea's needs can only be satisfied by Chinese cooperation. Events this April proved that the United States can only do so much to convince the North Koreans not to do something. With this in mind, there is little reason to brashly pursue policy that will bring the two countries even closer together.
Please read my article on Asia Times Online
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
Prospects for a New Trading Bloc
As the European Union teeters towards possible dissolution, a new trading bloc may emerge on the other side of the Eurasian landmass.
On May 12, 2012, Trade Ministers from Japan, South Korea and China agreed to propose to the leaders' summit (held in Beijing the next day on May 13, 2012) that the three countries should start FTA negotiations by the year’s end.
On the following day, Premier Wen Jiabao, PM Yoshihiko Noda, and President Lee Myungbak concluded the Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting in Beijing and signed the Trilateral Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment in which the three leaders pledged to work towards establishing a free trade agreement between the three countries. In a joint declaration, leaders of the three countries promised to further enhance the “future-oriented comprehensive cooperative partnership” to unleash vitality into the economic growth of the three countries, accelerate economic integration in East Asia, and facilitate economic recovery and growth in the world.
If the three countries are able to produce an exclusive free trade zone between the three countries, it will have a huge impact on the dynamic of the global market. According to the IMF, China, Japan and South Korea accounted for a combined 19.6 percent of global gross domestic product and 17.5 percent of world trade by value in 2010. In addition, the Japanese Ministry of Trade claimed that a trilateral free trade agreement would increase Japan's GDP by 0.3 percent, China's by 0.4 percent and South Korea's by 2.8 percent.
While both Premier Wen and PM Noda expressed enthusiasm for the potential trading bloc, President Lee showed a degree of reluctance during the negotiations. Many suggest that Seoul fears that a trilateral agreement will neutralize potential gains that could be gained through a bilateral FTA with China. Immediately following trilateral talks, South Korea and China held their first meeting on a bilateral FTA on Monday. Some observers say South Korea, which aims to expand its market share in China's automobile, TV, etc., intends to prioritize the bilateral negotiations over the trilateral talks. Sharing the Chinese market with Japanese corporations would not only reduce potential gains, but, according to Professor Kim Young Han, the country would also end up relying more on Japanese core components and other technology.
In addition, the domestic situation in South Korea could play a role in President Lee’s position. Following the ratification of the KORUS FTA in March, increasing number of people are voicing concerns regarding a possible FTA with Japan.
Japan would certainly greatly benefit from opening relations with both South Korea and China. According to Nomura Securities, establishing a bilateral FTA with China will raise Japan’s GDP by 0.68 percent, which is higher than the 0.35 percent growth expected with a bilateral FTA with the United States. Furthermore, the same study estimated that the trilateral FTA will boost Japan’s GDP by 0.74 percent (much higher than the Ministry of Trade estimate), exceeding the 0.54 percent increase offered by the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In a statement, PM Noda suggested that Japan would prefer to pursue both negotiations simultaneously.
However, the trilateral free trade agreement will most likely not bear fruit in the near future. AEI’s Claude Barfield notes that while the ROK-PRC bilateral negotiations have placed pressure on Japan to advance negotiations, the political turmoil and uncertainty prevent Tokyo from moving forward with any regional economic integration.
China has been proposing an intra-regional free trade zone for the past decade. Several attempts at bilateral agreements have also already occurred. In 2003, Seoul and Tokyo attempted to negotiation a FTA, but broke down after the two governments were unable to resolve their differences regarding agricultural products.
Agricultural exports will undoubtedly become a focal point in negotiations between the three countries. Both Japan and South Korea maintain massive farm subsidies and high tariffs to agricultural imports. Even so, the value of Chinese agricultural exports to Japan and South Korea in 2011 was $10.99 billion and $4.17 billion respectively. A quarter of China’s agricultural exports go to Japan and South Korea, thus Beijing is actively negotiating for the reduction of tariffs. While China promises to strike a balance in exports, domestic agriculture remains an extremely sensitive issue for both Japan and South Korea.
Meanwhile, President Ma Ying-jeou suggested on May 16, 2012 that Taiwan should join the trade pact between the three countries. Alongside aspirations for the intra-regional trade bloc, Ma also reiterated his intent to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement within eight years and said he expected to resume negotiations on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the US in the near future. At the same time, he pledged to complete follow-up negotiations under the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the PRC.
Taiwan is most likely prompted to jump start further negotiations on the ECFA and other FTAs because of the bilateral negotiations between the PRC and the ROK. Taiwanese manufacturers compete with South Korean corporations in electronics, steel, machinery, petrochemicals, plastics and textiles. Heavily dependent on exports to China, Taiwan’s competitiveness in the Chinese market relies heavily on the special economic status bestowed on Taiwanese corporations by Beijing. If South Korean firms were given a similar edge in the Chinese market, Taiwan’s industry could be under threat. Beijing has already stated that it expects the negotiations for PRC-ROK FTA to take no more than two years.
According to Liou To-hai, director of the National Chengchi University's Center for WTO Studies in Taipei, "should South Korea sign an FTA with China ahead of Taiwan and China completing agreements on trade in goods, trade in service and investment, all the dividend that Taiwan has gained from ECFA's early harvest program could be neutralized." In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan would also be affected. Since the signing of the ECFA, Japanese companies have used Taiwan as a gateway into the Chinese market, but Taiwan's special role could end as Japan is likely to shift its investment to South Korea.
2013 will see several key negotiations take shape and their results will most likely establish norms in the political economy of the region for decades to come. Northeast Asia is yet unready to establish an economic zone like the European Union, but steps that Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo (and possibly Taipei) take today will definitely set the stage for their future growth.
On May 12, 2012, Trade Ministers from Japan, South Korea and China agreed to propose to the leaders' summit (held in Beijing the next day on May 13, 2012) that the three countries should start FTA negotiations by the year’s end.
On the following day, Premier Wen Jiabao, PM Yoshihiko Noda, and President Lee Myungbak concluded the Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting in Beijing and signed the Trilateral Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment in which the three leaders pledged to work towards establishing a free trade agreement between the three countries. In a joint declaration, leaders of the three countries promised to further enhance the “future-oriented comprehensive cooperative partnership” to unleash vitality into the economic growth of the three countries, accelerate economic integration in East Asia, and facilitate economic recovery and growth in the world.
If the three countries are able to produce an exclusive free trade zone between the three countries, it will have a huge impact on the dynamic of the global market. According to the IMF, China, Japan and South Korea accounted for a combined 19.6 percent of global gross domestic product and 17.5 percent of world trade by value in 2010. In addition, the Japanese Ministry of Trade claimed that a trilateral free trade agreement would increase Japan's GDP by 0.3 percent, China's by 0.4 percent and South Korea's by 2.8 percent.
While both Premier Wen and PM Noda expressed enthusiasm for the potential trading bloc, President Lee showed a degree of reluctance during the negotiations. Many suggest that Seoul fears that a trilateral agreement will neutralize potential gains that could be gained through a bilateral FTA with China. Immediately following trilateral talks, South Korea and China held their first meeting on a bilateral FTA on Monday. Some observers say South Korea, which aims to expand its market share in China's automobile, TV, etc., intends to prioritize the bilateral negotiations over the trilateral talks. Sharing the Chinese market with Japanese corporations would not only reduce potential gains, but, according to Professor Kim Young Han, the country would also end up relying more on Japanese core components and other technology.
In addition, the domestic situation in South Korea could play a role in President Lee’s position. Following the ratification of the KORUS FTA in March, increasing number of people are voicing concerns regarding a possible FTA with Japan.
Japan would certainly greatly benefit from opening relations with both South Korea and China. According to Nomura Securities, establishing a bilateral FTA with China will raise Japan’s GDP by 0.68 percent, which is higher than the 0.35 percent growth expected with a bilateral FTA with the United States. Furthermore, the same study estimated that the trilateral FTA will boost Japan’s GDP by 0.74 percent (much higher than the Ministry of Trade estimate), exceeding the 0.54 percent increase offered by the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In a statement, PM Noda suggested that Japan would prefer to pursue both negotiations simultaneously.
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From Yomiuri Shimbun Online |
However, the trilateral free trade agreement will most likely not bear fruit in the near future. AEI’s Claude Barfield notes that while the ROK-PRC bilateral negotiations have placed pressure on Japan to advance negotiations, the political turmoil and uncertainty prevent Tokyo from moving forward with any regional economic integration.
China has been proposing an intra-regional free trade zone for the past decade. Several attempts at bilateral agreements have also already occurred. In 2003, Seoul and Tokyo attempted to negotiation a FTA, but broke down after the two governments were unable to resolve their differences regarding agricultural products.
Agricultural exports will undoubtedly become a focal point in negotiations between the three countries. Both Japan and South Korea maintain massive farm subsidies and high tariffs to agricultural imports. Even so, the value of Chinese agricultural exports to Japan and South Korea in 2011 was $10.99 billion and $4.17 billion respectively. A quarter of China’s agricultural exports go to Japan and South Korea, thus Beijing is actively negotiating for the reduction of tariffs. While China promises to strike a balance in exports, domestic agriculture remains an extremely sensitive issue for both Japan and South Korea.
Meanwhile, President Ma Ying-jeou suggested on May 16, 2012 that Taiwan should join the trade pact between the three countries. Alongside aspirations for the intra-regional trade bloc, Ma also reiterated his intent to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement within eight years and said he expected to resume negotiations on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the US in the near future. At the same time, he pledged to complete follow-up negotiations under the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the PRC.
Taiwan is most likely prompted to jump start further negotiations on the ECFA and other FTAs because of the bilateral negotiations between the PRC and the ROK. Taiwanese manufacturers compete with South Korean corporations in electronics, steel, machinery, petrochemicals, plastics and textiles. Heavily dependent on exports to China, Taiwan’s competitiveness in the Chinese market relies heavily on the special economic status bestowed on Taiwanese corporations by Beijing. If South Korean firms were given a similar edge in the Chinese market, Taiwan’s industry could be under threat. Beijing has already stated that it expects the negotiations for PRC-ROK FTA to take no more than two years.
According to Liou To-hai, director of the National Chengchi University's Center for WTO Studies in Taipei, "should South Korea sign an FTA with China ahead of Taiwan and China completing agreements on trade in goods, trade in service and investment, all the dividend that Taiwan has gained from ECFA's early harvest program could be neutralized." In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan would also be affected. Since the signing of the ECFA, Japanese companies have used Taiwan as a gateway into the Chinese market, but Taiwan's special role could end as Japan is likely to shift its investment to South Korea.
2013 will see several key negotiations take shape and their results will most likely establish norms in the political economy of the region for decades to come. Northeast Asia is yet unready to establish an economic zone like the European Union, but steps that Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo (and possibly Taipei) take today will definitely set the stage for their future growth.
Monday, May 14, 2012
Putin’s Return to the Wild East
During a Russian Federation Security Council meeting in December 2006, the presidential envoy to the Russian Far East suggested creating a commission subordinate to the prime minister which would oversee all development projects in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. Last month, the Economic Development Ministry drafted a bill that will establish a state corporation authorized to distribute licenses for mineral extraction in 16 administrative zones. Nicknamed the “Far Eastern Republic,” the corporation will be partially exempt from federal legislation, receive massive tax breaks, operate outside regional state control, and receive shares of other state companies as investment.
The idea behind the “Far Eastern Republic” is similar to the 2006 proposal - only this time the project is subordinate to the president who will have the power to appoint the head of the company and name the supervisory board. This constant proposal to present special economic authority to Putin (who would have been in charge of the project in 2008 as premier) represents a clear indication that Vladimir Vladimirovich is heavily invested in the development of the Far East. Indeed, he probably recognizes that domestic support for his administration rides on continued economic growth. For that to occur, Russia must tap into the vast natural resource reserves beneath its most underdeveloped regions.
Alongside exports to China, Russia has also opened up export opportunities to Japan and the Koreas. Earlier this month, Democratic Party of Japan policy chief Seiji Maehara and Alexander Medvedev, Vice President of Gazprom, agreed to study the possibility of laying a gas pipeline linking Hokkaido and Sakhalin Islands.
With all these opportunities, the biggest obstacle to Russia's development in the Far East will be the heavy handed involvement of the state in the region. The "Far Eastern Republic" is being heavily criticized by Russia's former finance minister Alexei Kudrin who recognizes that
Indeed given the opportunity, enterprises in Russia appear ready to invest in assets in the Russian Far East. For example, when Vanino seaport in Khabarovsk Krai was privatized in May 2011, 73% stake in the seaport was bought for 10.8 billion rubles ($354 million) after the bid started at 934 million rubles ($30.6 million). Although the winning company is currently undergoing trial resulting from its failure to make the down payment on the seaport, it is an example of how much the assets in the Russian Far East are in demand.
The problem with privatization for the Kremlin is two things:
While Putin will undoubtedly remain closely engaged in the Far East during his 6-year term, the efforts to develop the Russian Far East have already been sullied by heavy state control over the project. If Moscow desires a prosperous future for the Russian people, it really must consider a more effective and efficient means of access its mineral wealth.
Read my article on Asia Times Online
The idea behind the “Far Eastern Republic” is similar to the 2006 proposal - only this time the project is subordinate to the president who will have the power to appoint the head of the company and name the supervisory board. This constant proposal to present special economic authority to Putin (who would have been in charge of the project in 2008 as premier) represents a clear indication that Vladimir Vladimirovich is heavily invested in the development of the Far East. Indeed, he probably recognizes that domestic support for his administration rides on continued economic growth. For that to occur, Russia must tap into the vast natural resource reserves beneath its most underdeveloped regions.
Alongside exports to China, Russia has also opened up export opportunities to Japan and the Koreas. Earlier this month, Democratic Party of Japan policy chief Seiji Maehara and Alexander Medvedev, Vice President of Gazprom, agreed to study the possibility of laying a gas pipeline linking Hokkaido and Sakhalin Islands.
With all these opportunities, the biggest obstacle to Russia's development in the Far East will be the heavy handed involvement of the state in the region. The "Far Eastern Republic" is being heavily criticized by Russia's former finance minister Alexei Kudrin who recognizes that
the creation of such a market player capable of implementing any private project, considering the state's administrative resource and [special preferences], means that any other investor in this area must be aware that another player with special preferences, special administrative resources and special access to finances may come to the market at any momentA supporter of privatization, Kudrin believes that Moscow's current policies are damaging to the investment climate in the country.
Indeed given the opportunity, enterprises in Russia appear ready to invest in assets in the Russian Far East. For example, when Vanino seaport in Khabarovsk Krai was privatized in May 2011, 73% stake in the seaport was bought for 10.8 billion rubles ($354 million) after the bid started at 934 million rubles ($30.6 million). Although the winning company is currently undergoing trial resulting from its failure to make the down payment on the seaport, it is an example of how much the assets in the Russian Far East are in demand.
The problem with privatization for the Kremlin is two things:
- "Privatization" of the 1990s left a bad reputation for entrepreneurship; the Russian people only remember economic downfall, oligarchs and corruption - the Putin administration came to power in 2000 with the goal of cleaning up the socio-economic ramifications of the Yeltsin era, thus openly endorsing privatization for the Far East is politically difficult
- Privatization would mean letting go of control over major companies. This will in the short term decrease government revenue
While Putin will undoubtedly remain closely engaged in the Far East during his 6-year term, the efforts to develop the Russian Far East have already been sullied by heavy state control over the project. If Moscow desires a prosperous future for the Russian people, it really must consider a more effective and efficient means of access its mineral wealth.
Read my article on Asia Times Online
Sunday, May 6, 2012
State of Play
General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, gave a presentation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on May 1, 2012.
His main focus was on the method of implementing US foreign policy abroad and he underscored three elements:
The adaptation of these new concepts is going to be affected by the “sequestration” of the budget; therefore, Dempsey noted that specific strategic plans will not be considered until congress finalizes the budget.
Of course Dempsey made the usual caveat that these changes are not designed to be a tool for containing China. He emphasized that Washington must not fall into Thucydides' Trap where war becomes inevitable mainly because one party believes that military confrontation is inevitable.
At the same time, placing greater responsibilities and capabilities in the hands of US allies in the region could mean increasing space for a confrontation between Washington and Beijing. In particular, Japan and the Philippines are bent on deterring Chinese incursion into their (claimed) maritime territories - greater maneuver space and firepower for Manila and Tokyo open the possibility of those countries engaging in aggressive behavior that they otherwise may not have undertaken if the US was indisputably at the helm.
The policy of regional economic-defense cooperation is probably a good policy when the US is strapped for resources; however, the distribution of the security guarantees will not work unless the key issues themselves are first diffused. The US and PRC are both important to one another - a political, economic and diplomatic understanding should be reached before undertaking action that could be misinterpreted. It's still all about diplomacy.
His main focus was on the method of implementing US foreign policy abroad and he underscored three elements:
- Re-balancing to the Asia-Pacific cannot be just about increasing military hardware. The “intellectual bandwidth” (i.e. the way we conceive of tactics) of policymakers must also adapt to the new era to apply "smart power."
- The US must work with others to respond to the security paradox; people live in a relatively safer era, but the capacity for individuals to commit violence has also increased in the last few decades - contemporary threats operate in decentralized, syndicated (state, non-state, and criminal) and networked forms. In order to more effectively confront these issues on every level, the US government must not only establish inter-agency partnerships, but also network with other nations.
- Policies must integrate new technological capabilities. Communication and cyberspace capabilities have evolved in the past decade; therefore, new strategies must likewise adapt to these new conditions to better prepare for challenges that will arise from these changes.
The adaptation of these new concepts is going to be affected by the “sequestration” of the budget; therefore, Dempsey noted that specific strategic plans will not be considered until congress finalizes the budget.
Of course Dempsey made the usual caveat that these changes are not designed to be a tool for containing China. He emphasized that Washington must not fall into Thucydides' Trap where war becomes inevitable mainly because one party believes that military confrontation is inevitable.
At the same time, placing greater responsibilities and capabilities in the hands of US allies in the region could mean increasing space for a confrontation between Washington and Beijing. In particular, Japan and the Philippines are bent on deterring Chinese incursion into their (claimed) maritime territories - greater maneuver space and firepower for Manila and Tokyo open the possibility of those countries engaging in aggressive behavior that they otherwise may not have undertaken if the US was indisputably at the helm.
The policy of regional economic-defense cooperation is probably a good policy when the US is strapped for resources; however, the distribution of the security guarantees will not work unless the key issues themselves are first diffused. The US and PRC are both important to one another - a political, economic and diplomatic understanding should be reached before undertaking action that could be misinterpreted. It's still all about diplomacy.
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
How to tango with Pyongyang
New evidence unearthed by the North Korea International Documentation Project suggests that the 1968 hijacking of the USS Pueblo and the dramatic increase in violence between 1967 and 1968 were motivated by Pyongyang's desires to mend ties with Beijing. According to Romanian sources, Kim Il Sung believed that following Mao's anti-US strategy of opening a "second front" on the Korean Peninsula would bring much needed aid and supplies to the DPRK from the PRC.
This new interpretation of the Pueblo Crisis would remain consistent with how North Korea suddenly changed its behavior towards South Korea (despite maintaining hostile intentions) when China began its rapprochement with the US.
The new narrative of the Pueblo Crisis characterizes Pyongyang as malleable and responding to international conditions, running counter to how many have implicitly portrayed the state.
In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Jennifer Lind forwarded three elements that facilitate North Korea's deterrent capabilities:
However, the new Romanian evidence on the Pueblo Crisis challenges this view.
If North Korea does indeed react to outside forces, then it is likely to want, first and foremost, to reduce its overwhelming insecurity. This may create an opportunity for Washington to work with - Ambassador Morton Abramowitz suggested dispatching a senior-level politician (like the VP) to negotiate trading security, recognition, etc. for Pyongyang's missiles and nukes.
Alternatively the US could do nothing and see the entire region descend into paranoia and North Korean children starve to death. Washington ought to take the step to change the region for good.
Read my slightly less hyperbolic article on Asia Times Online
This new interpretation of the Pueblo Crisis would remain consistent with how North Korea suddenly changed its behavior towards South Korea (despite maintaining hostile intentions) when China began its rapprochement with the US.
The new narrative of the Pueblo Crisis characterizes Pyongyang as malleable and responding to international conditions, running counter to how many have implicitly portrayed the state.
In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Jennifer Lind forwarded three elements that facilitate North Korea's deterrent capabilities:
- unpredictability
- the catastrophic consequences of North Korea’s collapse
- the regime’s nuclear capabilities.
However, the new Romanian evidence on the Pueblo Crisis challenges this view.
If North Korea does indeed react to outside forces, then it is likely to want, first and foremost, to reduce its overwhelming insecurity. This may create an opportunity for Washington to work with - Ambassador Morton Abramowitz suggested dispatching a senior-level politician (like the VP) to negotiate trading security, recognition, etc. for Pyongyang's missiles and nukes.
Alternatively the US could do nothing and see the entire region descend into paranoia and North Korean children starve to death. Washington ought to take the step to change the region for good.
Read my slightly less hyperbolic article on Asia Times Online
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
Populism, internet freedoms and government spending
It's a critical year for several democracies around the world. President Sarkozy faces an uphill battle in the second round of elections; Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte tendered his government's resignation after failing to agree on new budget cuts; President Obama faces off Mitt Romney in the most important elections in the world; Prime Minister Noda will most likely fall victim to the split Diet this year or next; South Koreans will choose their president after the national assembly elections failed to yield a clear popular mandate for any party.
But elections in 2012 stand out from past displays of democratic principles - there appears to be a new wave of populism sweeping over the world, primarily characterized by widespread discourse regarding the role of government in the lives of the multitude.
In particular, defending the rights of individuals online has produced a political movement that will only gain greater following as US and EU policymakers continue to draft draconian measures to limit the freedom of speech. Democratization of public opinion through the medium of social networking sites has been an empowering force and the new Pirate Party seeks to "make sure that the offline civil liberties would carry over into the online world"
They have a five step plan:
Meanwhile, the looming economic crisis has European country on edge and elected officials in a quandary - governments need to pass austerity measures to safeguard the economy, yet the public rejects any budget that would scale back spending on welfare.
Just today, the Dutch government collapsed over a new austerity budget that would have brought deficits below 3% of the GDP as agreed upon in the EU fiscal pact. According to journalist Neil Clark:
But elections in 2012 stand out from past displays of democratic principles - there appears to be a new wave of populism sweeping over the world, primarily characterized by widespread discourse regarding the role of government in the lives of the multitude.
In particular, defending the rights of individuals online has produced a political movement that will only gain greater following as US and EU policymakers continue to draft draconian measures to limit the freedom of speech. Democratization of public opinion through the medium of social networking sites has been an empowering force and the new Pirate Party seeks to "make sure that the offline civil liberties would carry over into the online world"
They have a five step plan:
- Create Sweden’s largest youth wing of any party, giving [them] credibility enough to succeed in…
- The European Elections, where [they] need to beat 4% (note: [they] got 7.13%), which in turn is a stepping stone to…
- Getting entry in the Swedish Parliament, which would start turning things around immediately. But in order to really change European policy, [they] need to…
- Take about 5% in 3-4 more key parliaments in Europe, in key countries like Germany, France, or Poland, and use the combined leverage of those heavyweight parliaments to change the view on information policy across the European Union. Once that is done…
- The world would have to follow, since no monopolistic repression happens if Europe doesn’t agree to it – since the EU is the world’s largest economy, larger than the US.
Considering the already sizable and growing support for this movement, Pirate Parties will have a place in European Union policymaking in the near future.
Just today, the Dutch government collapsed over a new austerity budget that would have brought deficits below 3% of the GDP as agreed upon in the EU fiscal pact. According to journalist Neil Clark:
The people have had enough of austerity... Holland’s GDP growth in the ten years since it’s had the Euro has just been 1.5 per cent. And they’re now being told that because of this absolutely insane fiscal pact that was agreed upon last year. It will destroy the good life that the Dutch people have been used to over the years. And unsurprisingly the Dutch are saying, it’s enough.
Indeed, decreasing government spending is politically challenging and ruinous for coalitions; however, Sweden provides a clear example of how decreased spending complemented by reduction of taxes could have a positive effect on growth.
According to Sweden's finance minister Anders Borg, Stockholm owes its success to the following policies that were unpopular at start, but proved instrumental in improving services and development
According to Sweden's finance minister Anders Borg, Stockholm owes its success to the following policies that were unpopular at start, but proved instrumental in improving services and development
- Substantially reducing income taxes - particularly, through the introduction of earned income tax credits, for low- and middle-income earners - and reforming benefits systems.
- Reforming the educational system and improving the situation of groups with weak employment prospects. In particular, developing schools and vocational training to better target knowledge and skills for a modern economy.
- A strong commitment to sound public finances; a fiscal policy framework with an expenditure ceiling and a surplus target
- Pro-growth reforms including the de-regulation of markets, selling of state-owned companies, introducing competition in health care and education, abolishing of wealth and inheritance taxes.
The US Tea Party supported similar positions, but overburdened itself by unnecessarily supporting socially conservative issues and failing to come up with a clear economic plan to resolve the deficit without capsizing the entire economy. In addition, the movement seems to be losing momentum as the Republican Party fields slightly more right than it had in the past.
While policymakers in the US and EU struggle to develop sound fiscal policy for long-term growth, Argentina has fallen wayside (again) - the decision to nationalize the oil firm YPF appears to be driven more by President Kirchner's desire to pander to the public than short or long-term benefits to the country.
Competing domestic forces have always limited the number of policies that elected officials can carry out. The new element in the 21st century is the increasing power of the masses to fuel the momentum of political movements. This will produce a mixed bag of politicians: some like Anders Borg will pursue policy and allow the results to speak for themselves; others like Christina Kirchner will revert to directly appealing to the public through cheap cosmetic measures such as nationalization and bursts of public spending.
As the US presidential election approaches, it remains to be seen how each of the candidates will field their positions - and unhappy America may see both candidates buckle
While policymakers in the US and EU struggle to develop sound fiscal policy for long-term growth, Argentina has fallen wayside (again) - the decision to nationalize the oil firm YPF appears to be driven more by President Kirchner's desire to pander to the public than short or long-term benefits to the country.
Competing domestic forces have always limited the number of policies that elected officials can carry out. The new element in the 21st century is the increasing power of the masses to fuel the momentum of political movements. This will produce a mixed bag of politicians: some like Anders Borg will pursue policy and allow the results to speak for themselves; others like Christina Kirchner will revert to directly appealing to the public through cheap cosmetic measures such as nationalization and bursts of public spending.
As the US presidential election approaches, it remains to be seen how each of the candidates will field their positions - and unhappy America may see both candidates buckle
Friday, April 20, 2012
We built this nation on these mountains... rivers... and dams
The importance of energy security in attaining both national security and prosperity has been pronounced since the industrial revolution. Today, as the rising cost of crude oil threatens to break the backs of the global community, debating the issues surrounding energy production, distribution and consumption has become unavoidable.
However, there is a skewed focus. Analysts have mostly focused on how the industrialized economic-core acquires fuel resources from the periphery. Little attention has been expended on how countries without a massive mineral energy reserve will cope with development and how the challenges they face may lead to wider complications.
A recent article on Asia Times Online by Eelke P Kraak, titled "Power nexus skews Kyrgyz dam demand," captured the importance of energy politics in the periphery and sketched out possible consequences of the developments in Central Asia going awry.
To briefly summarize the crucial events, Kyrgyzstan has been constructing hydroelectric dams along the Syr Darya River, which brings water from the Tian Shan Mountains to the Aral Sea. For Bishkek, the project is absolutely necessary for the establishment of a functioning economy. However, this project has instigated conflict with Uzbekistan, which requires the water from the Syr Darya for its agriculture. And the conflict is just beginning: the Kambarata II Dam, which was inaugurated in August of 2010, was the first of 6-8 damns planned along the Kambarata cascade on the Syr Darya-Naryn river system.
Kraak sees the Soviet legacy of forcing industrial agriculture on the Central Asian nations as the roots of the conflict.
Kraak sees an economic solution
In addition, Kraak notes that rumors suggest a Russian hand in the hydroelectricity development in Kyrgyzstan. Apparently Moscow provided large loans to Bishkek in 2009 to jump start the dam construction and many interpreted this as the Kremlin's attempt to dislodge the US from Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan.
While I disagree with the implicit assertion that Moscow seeks a solid political hegemony in the region, Russia's vested interest in Kyrgyzstan (directly tied to its own national security) does make it difficult for the regional parties to come to a compromise.
Water sharing is a difficult issue to resolve and it's unclear if there really is a win-win solution. If hostilities over resources manifest in violence, the ramifications of such an event in an unstable and volatile region like Central Asia will be catastrophic. For Washington, attempting to bring stability to the region, poverty in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan acts as an obstacle that hinders statecraft and reconstruction of Afghanistan. This reflects one example of how scarcity and competition over natural resources can spill over into other vital areas of interest.
This much is clear: the increasingly self-evident nexus between energy production and food acquisition (or other agricultural products; like cotton) will be a pivotal facet of international development from now on and it will haunt both the developed and developing world. In short, scarcity in the periphery is not just the problem of the periphery alone, it's everybody's problem.
However, there is a skewed focus. Analysts have mostly focused on how the industrialized economic-core acquires fuel resources from the periphery. Little attention has been expended on how countries without a massive mineral energy reserve will cope with development and how the challenges they face may lead to wider complications.
A recent article on Asia Times Online by Eelke P Kraak, titled "Power nexus skews Kyrgyz dam demand," captured the importance of energy politics in the periphery and sketched out possible consequences of the developments in Central Asia going awry.
To briefly summarize the crucial events, Kyrgyzstan has been constructing hydroelectric dams along the Syr Darya River, which brings water from the Tian Shan Mountains to the Aral Sea. For Bishkek, the project is absolutely necessary for the establishment of a functioning economy. However, this project has instigated conflict with Uzbekistan, which requires the water from the Syr Darya for its agriculture. And the conflict is just beginning: the Kambarata II Dam, which was inaugurated in August of 2010, was the first of 6-8 damns planned along the Kambarata cascade on the Syr Darya-Naryn river system.
Kraak sees the Soviet legacy of forcing industrial agriculture on the Central Asian nations as the roots of the conflict.
The Kambarata cascade is by no means the first hydropower intervention in the Aral Sea basin of which the Syr Darya covers half the drainage area. Hundreds of dams have been constructed since the 1930s as well as a plethora of reservoirs, irrigation canals, and other water management structures. These developments were part of the Soviet hydropower mission, a modernisation plan that made the conquest of nature an ideological imperative. By taming the wild Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers, it was thought, agricultural output could be greatly increased.Indeed, Moscow succeeded (with massive help from displaced ethnicities imprisoned in Uzbekistan) and created the "Cotton Belt" - but the consequences of this policy can literally be seen from space. The Aral Sea is on the verge of disappearing.
![]() |
(Courtesy of the United Nations Environment Programme) |
Kraak sees an economic solution
According to economic analysis conducted by the World Bank, a win-win solution is actually possible without the expensive construction of more dams: recognising the economic value of water allows for the optimisation of existing dam operations. Kyrgyzstan could discharge water for Uzbek irrigation in summer, in exchange for nominal payments to cover the costs of an alternative electricity supply in winter.However, even Kraak recognizes that such a pragmatic solution would be difficult to achieve when you have domestic interests ("hydroelectric elites") that are determined to maximize its own gains via the construction of the dams.
In addition, Kraak notes that rumors suggest a Russian hand in the hydroelectricity development in Kyrgyzstan. Apparently Moscow provided large loans to Bishkek in 2009 to jump start the dam construction and many interpreted this as the Kremlin's attempt to dislodge the US from Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan.
While I disagree with the implicit assertion that Moscow seeks a solid political hegemony in the region, Russia's vested interest in Kyrgyzstan (directly tied to its own national security) does make it difficult for the regional parties to come to a compromise.
Water sharing is a difficult issue to resolve and it's unclear if there really is a win-win solution. If hostilities over resources manifest in violence, the ramifications of such an event in an unstable and volatile region like Central Asia will be catastrophic. For Washington, attempting to bring stability to the region, poverty in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan acts as an obstacle that hinders statecraft and reconstruction of Afghanistan. This reflects one example of how scarcity and competition over natural resources can spill over into other vital areas of interest.
This much is clear: the increasingly self-evident nexus between energy production and food acquisition (or other agricultural products; like cotton) will be a pivotal facet of international development from now on and it will haunt both the developed and developing world. In short, scarcity in the periphery is not just the problem of the periphery alone, it's everybody's problem.
Thursday, April 12, 2012
End of an Era?
Tokyo is mobilizing for the upcoming North Korean launch with forwardness and confidence that is rarely seen in Japanese foreign policy. It is very possible that this is an indicator of the changing status quo in the Asia-Pacific: Japan is breaking from its Cold War-era role as a dependent state of the United States and making it on its own.
3 days before South Korea's befuddled officials announced their possible response to the rocket, Japan insisted with vigor that it would shoot down the rocket if it strayed into Japanese airspace. This announcement is somewhat shocking when you consider Article 9 of the Japanese constitution:
But the maintenance of the Yoshida Doctrine was always tenuous because it was not entirely rooted in the ideals of pacifism. On the contrary, this peace-loving policy was a cold and calculated maneuver that maximized gains both domestically and abroad. PM Shigeru Yoshida was able to satisfy both the left and right by institutionalizing neutrality while de facto remaining dependent on the US military. It was a brilliant political compromise to jump-start a shamed and defeated country.
So what has changed?
A lot of people are suggesting that it's China and its claims on Senkaku that has driven the Japanese to increase its focus on the military. But threats to Japan have always been present - 30 years ago it was the Soviet Union.
If we put the world of PM Yoshida and PM Yoshihiko Noda next to each other, one crucial difference becomes very evident: the decline of the US.
Japan slowly began rearming itself in the 1990s because of demands from Washington for Tokyo to be more engaged in regional security and Japan half-heartedly went down that route. Now "regional security" is not just an ambiguous term: Japan's security doctrine has completely shifted from home island defense to far-island defense. It plans to add 2 more Hyuga-class helicopter carriers and purchase American F-35 fighters (with vertical landing and liftoff capabilities), which would effectively equip the Japanese Self-Defense Force with 4 aircraft carriers. Last year, Tokyo even removed the self-imposed ban on arms exports, making way for the military-industrial complex to grow.
What Tokyo and other governments in Asia see is the increasing powerlessness of the United States before its own massive internal problems, both political and economic. For instance, Bruce Klinger notes:
While policymakers in Washington cheer Japan's increasing aggressiveness, few have raised the point that Tokyo's policies may be more of an indicator of American weakness.
The implications of Japan becoming a military force in the region are grave. There are ever-increasing tensions over the South China Sea and adding more robust military players into the region may not be a good solution. In addition, North Korea's response to Tokyo's militarization could also have some serious ramifications.
All in all, Northeast Asia is in for a rocky decade.
Check out my article on Asia Times Online
3 days before South Korea's befuddled officials announced their possible response to the rocket, Japan insisted with vigor that it would shoot down the rocket if it strayed into Japanese airspace. This announcement is somewhat shocking when you consider Article 9 of the Japanese constitution:
ARTICLE 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.During the Cold War, this law and the corresponding foreign policy doctrine (The Yoshida Doctrine) presented one of the best examples of the peace dividend. Tokyo was able to rehabilitate its international status and mend relations with victims of Japanese imperialism while receiving protection from the United States. Reconstruction of a bombed-out country is much easier when the government focuses entirely on the economy.
But the maintenance of the Yoshida Doctrine was always tenuous because it was not entirely rooted in the ideals of pacifism. On the contrary, this peace-loving policy was a cold and calculated maneuver that maximized gains both domestically and abroad. PM Shigeru Yoshida was able to satisfy both the left and right by institutionalizing neutrality while de facto remaining dependent on the US military. It was a brilliant political compromise to jump-start a shamed and defeated country.
So what has changed?
A lot of people are suggesting that it's China and its claims on Senkaku that has driven the Japanese to increase its focus on the military. But threats to Japan have always been present - 30 years ago it was the Soviet Union.
If we put the world of PM Yoshida and PM Yoshihiko Noda next to each other, one crucial difference becomes very evident: the decline of the US.
Japan slowly began rearming itself in the 1990s because of demands from Washington for Tokyo to be more engaged in regional security and Japan half-heartedly went down that route. Now "regional security" is not just an ambiguous term: Japan's security doctrine has completely shifted from home island defense to far-island defense. It plans to add 2 more Hyuga-class helicopter carriers and purchase American F-35 fighters (with vertical landing and liftoff capabilities), which would effectively equip the Japanese Self-Defense Force with 4 aircraft carriers. Last year, Tokyo even removed the self-imposed ban on arms exports, making way for the military-industrial complex to grow.
What Tokyo and other governments in Asia see is the increasing powerlessness of the United States before its own massive internal problems, both political and economic. For instance, Bruce Klinger notes:
The new defense strategy could prevent the U.S. from fulfilling its existing treaty requirements. For example, the current war plan responding to a North Korean invasion (OPLAN 5027) calls for the U.S. to deploy 690,000 ground troops, 160 destroyers, and 2,000 aircraft within 90 days. Doing so would require the entire U.S. Army and Marine Corps after the budget cuts. The Obama Administration should make clear to South Korea that future U.S. force levels will not support the current war plan.No wonder the Japanese are rearming themselves - with Asia unstable as always with North Korean provocations and Chinese assertiveness, and with the US increasingly unable to fulfill its role as defender, Tokyo sees few options outside militarization. On top of that, unlike the 1940s and 50s, the economy is fairing better than people think it is.
While policymakers in Washington cheer Japan's increasing aggressiveness, few have raised the point that Tokyo's policies may be more of an indicator of American weakness.
The implications of Japan becoming a military force in the region are grave. There are ever-increasing tensions over the South China Sea and adding more robust military players into the region may not be a good solution. In addition, North Korea's response to Tokyo's militarization could also have some serious ramifications.
All in all, Northeast Asia is in for a rocky decade.
Check out my article on Asia Times Online
Tuesday, April 3, 2012
Missiles, oh my!
North Korea's pronouncement that it will launch a satellite to celebrate the centennial of Kim Il Sung's birth has thrown the world into dismay. The thinly veiled decision to test its ballistic missile was even more shocking because Pyongyang had agreed to a missile test moratorium not a month before.
The timing could not have been worse for US foreign policymakers: the domestic situation in the US is fragile, weakening the resolve of Washington's close allies, while the ongoing crises in Syria and Iran continue to vie for Washington's attention. The "Leap-day Deal," the result of a year long negotiation, could have been President Obama's sole diplomatic accomplishment with humanitarian assistance rolling in (albeit late) behind IAEA inspectors and the ground works for restarting the Six-party Talks. Instead, the president's trip to Seoul for the nuclear summit was completely sullied by the foretold provocation.
So what has been the general talk on the whole crisis?
North Korea appears surprised by all the international condemnation, claiming that the launch will be for peaceful, scientific purposes. In November of 2011, Pyongyang published a white paper titled “Space Is Common Wealth of Humankind” where it claimed that space "serves as a powerful engine propelling the future development of science and technology as well as economy" and criticizing the US for "spurr[ing] the scenario for converting the space into the theatre of a war for realizing its strategy for world domination." This should have been read as a possible sign of North Korea's intent to test its ballistic missile capabilities under the guise of a satellite launch as it did in 2009.
This may have been disregarded because Washington probably assumed that Pyongyang knew that a satellite launch violates UN Security Council Resolution 1874 which banned the North Koreans from conducting anything involving their ballistic missile technology. Perhaps it should have been made more explicit.
Stephen Haggard summarized several legal issues surrounding North Korea's satellite launch and possible rationale behind Pyongyang's actions. Here are three hypotheses that he presents in why Pyongyang backed away from the deal.
With the launch most assuredly moving forward, the question now is how to move forward in this time of uncertainty.
President Obama's first plan was to rally support from the Chinese. However, despite his tacit support against the launch, Hu Jintao will probably not move to really antagonize North Korea.
Both Japan and South Korea have announced that they will intercept the rocket if it strays from its expected trajectory. Those are very serious claims considering the well-known prowess of North Korean rocket scientists in keeping their rockets in the air much less in a pre-calculated trajectory. It's good that the US government has not said anything about intercepting or striking the rocket while still on the launch pad.
The approach that appears most amenable is reengagement using assistance and economic development as carrots. Professor Michael Mazzar suggests
The point is that there are plenty of reasons why North Korea remains antagonistic; one cannot expect two nations to build trust without first establishing diplomatic relations nor negotiate over demilitarization without a peace treaty. It's time that Washington stops allowing Pyongyang to surprise it and instead surprise the North Koreans. America needs a peace offensive.
The timing could not have been worse for US foreign policymakers: the domestic situation in the US is fragile, weakening the resolve of Washington's close allies, while the ongoing crises in Syria and Iran continue to vie for Washington's attention. The "Leap-day Deal," the result of a year long negotiation, could have been President Obama's sole diplomatic accomplishment with humanitarian assistance rolling in (albeit late) behind IAEA inspectors and the ground works for restarting the Six-party Talks. Instead, the president's trip to Seoul for the nuclear summit was completely sullied by the foretold provocation.
So what has been the general talk on the whole crisis?
North Korea appears surprised by all the international condemnation, claiming that the launch will be for peaceful, scientific purposes. In November of 2011, Pyongyang published a white paper titled “Space Is Common Wealth of Humankind” where it claimed that space "serves as a powerful engine propelling the future development of science and technology as well as economy" and criticizing the US for "spurr[ing] the scenario for converting the space into the theatre of a war for realizing its strategy for world domination." This should have been read as a possible sign of North Korea's intent to test its ballistic missile capabilities under the guise of a satellite launch as it did in 2009.
This may have been disregarded because Washington probably assumed that Pyongyang knew that a satellite launch violates UN Security Council Resolution 1874 which banned the North Koreans from conducting anything involving their ballistic missile technology. Perhaps it should have been made more explicit.
Stephen Haggard summarized several legal issues surrounding North Korea's satellite launch and possible rationale behind Pyongyang's actions. Here are three hypotheses that he presents in why Pyongyang backed away from the deal.
- That the February 29 deal was effectively vetoed by powerful groups in the military or elsewhere;
- That it’s all about inexperience; Kim Jung Un was sold a bill of goods by advisors who thought they could exploit the missile-satellite issue and get away with it;
- That this was completely calculated; Kim Jong Un knew the risks but rolled the dice in an effort to have it both ways (domestic political benefits of the launch plus substantive benefits of the deal).
With the launch most assuredly moving forward, the question now is how to move forward in this time of uncertainty.
President Obama's first plan was to rally support from the Chinese. However, despite his tacit support against the launch, Hu Jintao will probably not move to really antagonize North Korea.
Both Japan and South Korea have announced that they will intercept the rocket if it strays from its expected trajectory. Those are very serious claims considering the well-known prowess of North Korean rocket scientists in keeping their rockets in the air much less in a pre-calculated trajectory. It's good that the US government has not said anything about intercepting or striking the rocket while still on the launch pad.
The approach that appears most amenable is reengagement using assistance and economic development as carrots. Professor Michael Mazzar suggests
[A] new strategy using the twin forces — markets and information — to alter the system. The fundamental U.S. goals would be peace, stability and a gradual process of reform and evolution in the North that could eventually change the character of the regime. Unlike traditional proposals for engagement, this approach would not try to use trade and economic benefits to change the North's behavior. Instead, it would use targeted direct foreign investment, people-to-people contacts, training programs for North Korean technocrats and more to accelerate the rise of alternative power centers in the North.This is the safest plan for moving forward. I asserted before that leaving the North Korean masses to starve will negatively impact the long-term interests of the US. Other analysts also support the idea of proactively supporting the North Korean people to better prepare the US for North Korea's collapse. Some even consider aid to be a step towards taking down the regime. Gordon Chang believes that
Food aid, if properly monitored, can further erode regime controls on information. Foreign food monitors, present in the country to ensure no diversion of aid, give the North Korean people an opportunity to meet outsiders and thereby learn the truth about their own society and the outside world. Moreover, the presence of the monitors tests the limits of the state’s ability. There are simply not enough local minders to watch over foreign workers, doctors, and monitors. In fact, there has been unsupervised contact between foreign food monitors and North Koreans.There is clearly a compelling argument for continuing engagement with the North Koreans through humanitarian assistance. For its part, Pyongyang is willing to continue negotiations and have not rescinded its invitation of IAEA inspectors in the face of Washington halting the delivery aid.
The point is that there are plenty of reasons why North Korea remains antagonistic; one cannot expect two nations to build trust without first establishing diplomatic relations nor negotiate over demilitarization without a peace treaty. It's time that Washington stops allowing Pyongyang to surprise it and instead surprise the North Koreans. America needs a peace offensive.
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