The gradual integration of Asia's diverse economies will bring improvements in certain parts of their economies - and carry risks that existing disparities will widen. Food security must be at the forefront of such concerns. (August 2, 2012)
read the rest of the article at Asia Times
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Friday, August 3, 2012
Tuesday, May 29, 2012
An Uncertain Future Together
A follow-up to the previous post (Prospects for a New Trading Bloc), I feel it is necessary to provide further analysis on the possible motives behind South Korea's acceptance of the joint declaration which underscored the possibility of forming a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA). This new position is different from the more skeptical position that South Korea took in December last year.
Looking at the timing of Seoul's negotiations with its neighbors, economic benefits from closer regional economic integration appear to be only one of the many objectives that President Lee Myungbak had under consideration. Although the finalization of the agreement between Seoul and Tokyo was recently put on hold, a bilateral agreement on sharing military intelligence and logistics was in its final stage before the trilateral negotiations began. Immediately following the summit in Beijing, South Korea approached China about establishing a similar arrangement. The timing of these meetings should be read as an expression of Seoul's foreign policy objectives.
It is likely that President Lee is attempting to achieve a definitive foreign policy victory before his term ends. The biggest challenge to Lee was not just the two North Korean attacks in 2010, but also the meek response he received from the regional powers when he sought to reprimand Pyongyang. In particular, China's lukewarm response has been blamed for encouraging North Korea to continue provocative actions along the Northern Limitation Line. Preventing future attacks will require establishing a diplomatic environment in the region that would deter North Korea from behaving belligerently - with China enthusiastic about the trilateral FTA, Seoul may be hoping to use it as leverage to more closely align Beijing to South Korea's interests.
Despite the efforts, China is unlikely to change its position on North Korea in the near future, especially when the Chinese Communist Party is preparing for its power transition later this year. Furthermore, China needs North Korea to resource the necessary raw materials for the development of the northeastern provinces.
This should also provide a stark reminder to the United States that some of South Korea's needs can only be satisfied by Chinese cooperation. Events this April proved that the United States can only do so much to convince the North Koreans not to do something. With this in mind, there is little reason to brashly pursue policy that will bring the two countries even closer together.
Please read my article on Asia Times Online
Looking at the timing of Seoul's negotiations with its neighbors, economic benefits from closer regional economic integration appear to be only one of the many objectives that President Lee Myungbak had under consideration. Although the finalization of the agreement between Seoul and Tokyo was recently put on hold, a bilateral agreement on sharing military intelligence and logistics was in its final stage before the trilateral negotiations began. Immediately following the summit in Beijing, South Korea approached China about establishing a similar arrangement. The timing of these meetings should be read as an expression of Seoul's foreign policy objectives.
It is likely that President Lee is attempting to achieve a definitive foreign policy victory before his term ends. The biggest challenge to Lee was not just the two North Korean attacks in 2010, but also the meek response he received from the regional powers when he sought to reprimand Pyongyang. In particular, China's lukewarm response has been blamed for encouraging North Korea to continue provocative actions along the Northern Limitation Line. Preventing future attacks will require establishing a diplomatic environment in the region that would deter North Korea from behaving belligerently - with China enthusiastic about the trilateral FTA, Seoul may be hoping to use it as leverage to more closely align Beijing to South Korea's interests.
Despite the efforts, China is unlikely to change its position on North Korea in the near future, especially when the Chinese Communist Party is preparing for its power transition later this year. Furthermore, China needs North Korea to resource the necessary raw materials for the development of the northeastern provinces.
This should also provide a stark reminder to the United States that some of South Korea's needs can only be satisfied by Chinese cooperation. Events this April proved that the United States can only do so much to convince the North Koreans not to do something. With this in mind, there is little reason to brashly pursue policy that will bring the two countries even closer together.
Please read my article on Asia Times Online
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
Prospects for a New Trading Bloc
As the European Union teeters towards possible dissolution, a new trading bloc may emerge on the other side of the Eurasian landmass.
On May 12, 2012, Trade Ministers from Japan, South Korea and China agreed to propose to the leaders' summit (held in Beijing the next day on May 13, 2012) that the three countries should start FTA negotiations by the year’s end.
On the following day, Premier Wen Jiabao, PM Yoshihiko Noda, and President Lee Myungbak concluded the Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting in Beijing and signed the Trilateral Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment in which the three leaders pledged to work towards establishing a free trade agreement between the three countries. In a joint declaration, leaders of the three countries promised to further enhance the “future-oriented comprehensive cooperative partnership” to unleash vitality into the economic growth of the three countries, accelerate economic integration in East Asia, and facilitate economic recovery and growth in the world.
If the three countries are able to produce an exclusive free trade zone between the three countries, it will have a huge impact on the dynamic of the global market. According to the IMF, China, Japan and South Korea accounted for a combined 19.6 percent of global gross domestic product and 17.5 percent of world trade by value in 2010. In addition, the Japanese Ministry of Trade claimed that a trilateral free trade agreement would increase Japan's GDP by 0.3 percent, China's by 0.4 percent and South Korea's by 2.8 percent.
While both Premier Wen and PM Noda expressed enthusiasm for the potential trading bloc, President Lee showed a degree of reluctance during the negotiations. Many suggest that Seoul fears that a trilateral agreement will neutralize potential gains that could be gained through a bilateral FTA with China. Immediately following trilateral talks, South Korea and China held their first meeting on a bilateral FTA on Monday. Some observers say South Korea, which aims to expand its market share in China's automobile, TV, etc., intends to prioritize the bilateral negotiations over the trilateral talks. Sharing the Chinese market with Japanese corporations would not only reduce potential gains, but, according to Professor Kim Young Han, the country would also end up relying more on Japanese core components and other technology.
In addition, the domestic situation in South Korea could play a role in President Lee’s position. Following the ratification of the KORUS FTA in March, increasing number of people are voicing concerns regarding a possible FTA with Japan.
Japan would certainly greatly benefit from opening relations with both South Korea and China. According to Nomura Securities, establishing a bilateral FTA with China will raise Japan’s GDP by 0.68 percent, which is higher than the 0.35 percent growth expected with a bilateral FTA with the United States. Furthermore, the same study estimated that the trilateral FTA will boost Japan’s GDP by 0.74 percent (much higher than the Ministry of Trade estimate), exceeding the 0.54 percent increase offered by the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In a statement, PM Noda suggested that Japan would prefer to pursue both negotiations simultaneously.
However, the trilateral free trade agreement will most likely not bear fruit in the near future. AEI’s Claude Barfield notes that while the ROK-PRC bilateral negotiations have placed pressure on Japan to advance negotiations, the political turmoil and uncertainty prevent Tokyo from moving forward with any regional economic integration.
China has been proposing an intra-regional free trade zone for the past decade. Several attempts at bilateral agreements have also already occurred. In 2003, Seoul and Tokyo attempted to negotiation a FTA, but broke down after the two governments were unable to resolve their differences regarding agricultural products.
Agricultural exports will undoubtedly become a focal point in negotiations between the three countries. Both Japan and South Korea maintain massive farm subsidies and high tariffs to agricultural imports. Even so, the value of Chinese agricultural exports to Japan and South Korea in 2011 was $10.99 billion and $4.17 billion respectively. A quarter of China’s agricultural exports go to Japan and South Korea, thus Beijing is actively negotiating for the reduction of tariffs. While China promises to strike a balance in exports, domestic agriculture remains an extremely sensitive issue for both Japan and South Korea.
Meanwhile, President Ma Ying-jeou suggested on May 16, 2012 that Taiwan should join the trade pact between the three countries. Alongside aspirations for the intra-regional trade bloc, Ma also reiterated his intent to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement within eight years and said he expected to resume negotiations on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the US in the near future. At the same time, he pledged to complete follow-up negotiations under the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the PRC.
Taiwan is most likely prompted to jump start further negotiations on the ECFA and other FTAs because of the bilateral negotiations between the PRC and the ROK. Taiwanese manufacturers compete with South Korean corporations in electronics, steel, machinery, petrochemicals, plastics and textiles. Heavily dependent on exports to China, Taiwan’s competitiveness in the Chinese market relies heavily on the special economic status bestowed on Taiwanese corporations by Beijing. If South Korean firms were given a similar edge in the Chinese market, Taiwan’s industry could be under threat. Beijing has already stated that it expects the negotiations for PRC-ROK FTA to take no more than two years.
According to Liou To-hai, director of the National Chengchi University's Center for WTO Studies in Taipei, "should South Korea sign an FTA with China ahead of Taiwan and China completing agreements on trade in goods, trade in service and investment, all the dividend that Taiwan has gained from ECFA's early harvest program could be neutralized." In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan would also be affected. Since the signing of the ECFA, Japanese companies have used Taiwan as a gateway into the Chinese market, but Taiwan's special role could end as Japan is likely to shift its investment to South Korea.
2013 will see several key negotiations take shape and their results will most likely establish norms in the political economy of the region for decades to come. Northeast Asia is yet unready to establish an economic zone like the European Union, but steps that Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo (and possibly Taipei) take today will definitely set the stage for their future growth.
On May 12, 2012, Trade Ministers from Japan, South Korea and China agreed to propose to the leaders' summit (held in Beijing the next day on May 13, 2012) that the three countries should start FTA negotiations by the year’s end.
On the following day, Premier Wen Jiabao, PM Yoshihiko Noda, and President Lee Myungbak concluded the Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting in Beijing and signed the Trilateral Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment in which the three leaders pledged to work towards establishing a free trade agreement between the three countries. In a joint declaration, leaders of the three countries promised to further enhance the “future-oriented comprehensive cooperative partnership” to unleash vitality into the economic growth of the three countries, accelerate economic integration in East Asia, and facilitate economic recovery and growth in the world.
If the three countries are able to produce an exclusive free trade zone between the three countries, it will have a huge impact on the dynamic of the global market. According to the IMF, China, Japan and South Korea accounted for a combined 19.6 percent of global gross domestic product and 17.5 percent of world trade by value in 2010. In addition, the Japanese Ministry of Trade claimed that a trilateral free trade agreement would increase Japan's GDP by 0.3 percent, China's by 0.4 percent and South Korea's by 2.8 percent.
While both Premier Wen and PM Noda expressed enthusiasm for the potential trading bloc, President Lee showed a degree of reluctance during the negotiations. Many suggest that Seoul fears that a trilateral agreement will neutralize potential gains that could be gained through a bilateral FTA with China. Immediately following trilateral talks, South Korea and China held their first meeting on a bilateral FTA on Monday. Some observers say South Korea, which aims to expand its market share in China's automobile, TV, etc., intends to prioritize the bilateral negotiations over the trilateral talks. Sharing the Chinese market with Japanese corporations would not only reduce potential gains, but, according to Professor Kim Young Han, the country would also end up relying more on Japanese core components and other technology.
In addition, the domestic situation in South Korea could play a role in President Lee’s position. Following the ratification of the KORUS FTA in March, increasing number of people are voicing concerns regarding a possible FTA with Japan.
Japan would certainly greatly benefit from opening relations with both South Korea and China. According to Nomura Securities, establishing a bilateral FTA with China will raise Japan’s GDP by 0.68 percent, which is higher than the 0.35 percent growth expected with a bilateral FTA with the United States. Furthermore, the same study estimated that the trilateral FTA will boost Japan’s GDP by 0.74 percent (much higher than the Ministry of Trade estimate), exceeding the 0.54 percent increase offered by the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In a statement, PM Noda suggested that Japan would prefer to pursue both negotiations simultaneously.
 |
| From Yomiuri Shimbun Online |
However, the trilateral free trade agreement will most likely not bear fruit in the near future. AEI’s Claude Barfield notes that while the ROK-PRC bilateral negotiations have placed pressure on Japan to advance negotiations, the political turmoil and uncertainty prevent Tokyo from moving forward with any regional economic integration.
China has been proposing an intra-regional free trade zone for the past decade. Several attempts at bilateral agreements have also already occurred. In 2003, Seoul and Tokyo attempted to negotiation a FTA, but broke down after the two governments were unable to resolve their differences regarding agricultural products.
Agricultural exports will undoubtedly become a focal point in negotiations between the three countries. Both Japan and South Korea maintain massive farm subsidies and high tariffs to agricultural imports. Even so, the value of Chinese agricultural exports to Japan and South Korea in 2011 was $10.99 billion and $4.17 billion respectively. A quarter of China’s agricultural exports go to Japan and South Korea, thus Beijing is actively negotiating for the reduction of tariffs. While China promises to strike a balance in exports, domestic agriculture remains an extremely sensitive issue for both Japan and South Korea.
Meanwhile, President Ma Ying-jeou suggested on May 16, 2012 that Taiwan should join the trade pact between the three countries. Alongside aspirations for the intra-regional trade bloc, Ma also reiterated his intent to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement within eight years and said he expected to resume negotiations on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the US in the near future. At the same time, he pledged to complete follow-up negotiations under the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the PRC.
Taiwan is most likely prompted to jump start further negotiations on the ECFA and other FTAs because of the bilateral negotiations between the PRC and the ROK. Taiwanese manufacturers compete with South Korean corporations in electronics, steel, machinery, petrochemicals, plastics and textiles. Heavily dependent on exports to China, Taiwan’s competitiveness in the Chinese market relies heavily on the special economic status bestowed on Taiwanese corporations by Beijing. If South Korean firms were given a similar edge in the Chinese market, Taiwan’s industry could be under threat. Beijing has already stated that it expects the negotiations for PRC-ROK FTA to take no more than two years.
According to Liou To-hai, director of the National Chengchi University's Center for WTO Studies in Taipei, "should South Korea sign an FTA with China ahead of Taiwan and China completing agreements on trade in goods, trade in service and investment, all the dividend that Taiwan has gained from ECFA's early harvest program could be neutralized." In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan would also be affected. Since the signing of the ECFA, Japanese companies have used Taiwan as a gateway into the Chinese market, but Taiwan's special role could end as Japan is likely to shift its investment to South Korea.
2013 will see several key negotiations take shape and their results will most likely establish norms in the political economy of the region for decades to come. Northeast Asia is yet unready to establish an economic zone like the European Union, but steps that Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo (and possibly Taipei) take today will definitely set the stage for their future growth.
Sunday, May 6, 2012
State of Play
General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, gave a presentation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on May 1, 2012.
His main focus was on the method of implementing US foreign policy abroad and he underscored three elements:
The adaptation of these new concepts is going to be affected by the “sequestration” of the budget; therefore, Dempsey noted that specific strategic plans will not be considered until congress finalizes the budget.
Of course Dempsey made the usual caveat that these changes are not designed to be a tool for containing China. He emphasized that Washington must not fall into Thucydides' Trap where war becomes inevitable mainly because one party believes that military confrontation is inevitable.
At the same time, placing greater responsibilities and capabilities in the hands of US allies in the region could mean increasing space for a confrontation between Washington and Beijing. In particular, Japan and the Philippines are bent on deterring Chinese incursion into their (claimed) maritime territories - greater maneuver space and firepower for Manila and Tokyo open the possibility of those countries engaging in aggressive behavior that they otherwise may not have undertaken if the US was indisputably at the helm.
The policy of regional economic-defense cooperation is probably a good policy when the US is strapped for resources; however, the distribution of the security guarantees will not work unless the key issues themselves are first diffused. The US and PRC are both important to one another - a political, economic and diplomatic understanding should be reached before undertaking action that could be misinterpreted. It's still all about diplomacy.
His main focus was on the method of implementing US foreign policy abroad and he underscored three elements:
- Re-balancing to the Asia-Pacific cannot be just about increasing military hardware. The “intellectual bandwidth” (i.e. the way we conceive of tactics) of policymakers must also adapt to the new era to apply "smart power."
- The US must work with others to respond to the security paradox; people live in a relatively safer era, but the capacity for individuals to commit violence has also increased in the last few decades - contemporary threats operate in decentralized, syndicated (state, non-state, and criminal) and networked forms. In order to more effectively confront these issues on every level, the US government must not only establish inter-agency partnerships, but also network with other nations.
- Policies must integrate new technological capabilities. Communication and cyberspace capabilities have evolved in the past decade; therefore, new strategies must likewise adapt to these new conditions to better prepare for challenges that will arise from these changes.
The adaptation of these new concepts is going to be affected by the “sequestration” of the budget; therefore, Dempsey noted that specific strategic plans will not be considered until congress finalizes the budget.
Of course Dempsey made the usual caveat that these changes are not designed to be a tool for containing China. He emphasized that Washington must not fall into Thucydides' Trap where war becomes inevitable mainly because one party believes that military confrontation is inevitable.
At the same time, placing greater responsibilities and capabilities in the hands of US allies in the region could mean increasing space for a confrontation between Washington and Beijing. In particular, Japan and the Philippines are bent on deterring Chinese incursion into their (claimed) maritime territories - greater maneuver space and firepower for Manila and Tokyo open the possibility of those countries engaging in aggressive behavior that they otherwise may not have undertaken if the US was indisputably at the helm.
The policy of regional economic-defense cooperation is probably a good policy when the US is strapped for resources; however, the distribution of the security guarantees will not work unless the key issues themselves are first diffused. The US and PRC are both important to one another - a political, economic and diplomatic understanding should be reached before undertaking action that could be misinterpreted. It's still all about diplomacy.
Monday, January 23, 2012
The Intractable Issue of Energy
As South Korea and Japan haggle over the most appropriate method of castigating Tehran for its nuclear program while also ensuring continued supply of petroleum from Iran, I think it's useful to recollect the insights of the late Japanese economist Wakimura Yoshitaro (1900-96). A member of the leftist economic circle, the Ouchi group, Wakimura warned that the transport of Middle Eastern oil was a potential flashpoint for global conflict. Having lost faith in the West's ability to negotiate without coercing oil producing countries, members of the Ouchi group concluded that continued dependence on oil and Japan's alliance with the United States would invariably pull them into an unwanted conflict surrounding the black gold. Their solution was for Japan to go nuclear.
Today both Seoul and Tokyo are struggling to balance their economic needs and their political allegiance to the United States. I argued in my most recent article on Asia Times Online that Washington's aggressive policies in the Middle East threatens East Asia's economic security and thus damages America's ties with its allies in the region.
Middle Eastern oil is indispensable to the global economy, but in particular to countries that rely heavily on shipping and heavy industry. South Korea and Japan both fall into this category - even though Japan developed nuclear energy after the post-war reconstruction, there are certain sectors where petroleum is irreplaceable. Part of South Korea's remarkable economic growth was based on its development of petrochemical industries, obviously an enterprise where oil is a prerequisite. Mind you, both nations are practically island nations that depend heavily on shipping for import-export. Nuclear powered container ships are still in their experimental stage.
Therefore, Washington's request to significantly reduce or ban import of oil from Iran comes as a serious blow to both Seoul and Tokyo.
Some experts in Israel have waived off concerns over loss of industrial output by suggesting that South Korea simply increase imports from other Gulf emirates. Besides, they said, diffusing Iran will help the denuclearization process in North Korea.
What's absurd about all this is how little regard these "professionals" have for the intricacies of trade and commerce. Yes, some Gulf states that have historically been terrified of Iran have offered to increase exports to South Korea. But oil from Saudi Arabia does not magically appear in your local gas station the next day - this requires more ships, rerouting of ships and funds, negotiating new deals (nearly three quarters of South Korea's imports from Iran are negotiated on a long term basis and only a quarter is bought on spot price) and dozens of other infrastructural and financial consideration have to be made.
In addition, South Korea's fiscal regime keeps the Won from being overvalued - this safety mechanism, while keeping exports relatively affordable, raises the cost of imports. Escalation of tensions in the Straits of Hormuz and the expansion of sanctions against Iran will invariably affect the market. At the end of the day, South Korean industries will be still be heavily burdened even if they are supplied from different sources.
It's contemptuous to color this as a simple process, especially when one country is bending over backwards to satisfy another's irrational fears.
Furthermore, what happens in Iran will not affect North Korea. Commercial links between the two states have already ebbed long time ago due to increased policing and oversight by the international community. North Korean missiles are no longer entering Iran, but nuclear proliferation expert Joshua Pollack noted that technology transfers have continued unabated. And why point to North Korea? It's the single greatest example of how punitive sanctions don't always work.
Meanwhile, Washington has long recognized its diminishing power in the Asia-Pacific. Obama's "pivot" seeks to reassert the importance of the United States in the region - And let's be fair, no one has forgotten about the US. After all, US security guarantees to South Korea and the Seventh Fleet stationed in Japan are considered essential facets of the two countries' defenses. At the same time, US cannot revert the confluence of time. China's industrial prowess is going to inevitably make it economically influential in the region.
The Free Trade Agreement with South Korea and the Trans Pacific Partnership with Japan are two great ways for the United States to build on existing (and still massive) trade links with its allies in East Asia. Indeed, nothing solidifies a relationship between two countries more than the transfer of goods and peoples. Add ideals and sense of familiarity - the United States is still indispensable in every way imaginable.
How do you mess this up? Force your allies to swallow bitter medicine for a sickness they don't have.
Chinese premier Wen Jiaobao stepped in with good timing and suggested taking the Iranian issue to the UN. He opposed Iran's nuclear program, but he also noted the incredible hardship that will be wrought on the world if the sanctions expanded. It's a bad day when Beijing appears like the more rational actor. Make no mistake, Seoul and Tokyo are in part holding out for China to forestall the current crisis.
If the United States truly feels as though there is a need for a strategic refocusing in the Asia-Pacific, then Washington must take into greater consideration the interests and concerns of South Korea and Japan.
In fact, an American president must learn to better empathize with countries around the world in general. Wakimura Yoshitaro believed that powerful Western nations will never negotiate with, but merely dictate to Middle Eastern countries, creating conditions for simmering anger to one day boil over and scald the rest of the world. Time for the United States to step up and prove itself to be a better country than those from another era.
Read my less rambunctious article here
Today both Seoul and Tokyo are struggling to balance their economic needs and their political allegiance to the United States. I argued in my most recent article on Asia Times Online that Washington's aggressive policies in the Middle East threatens East Asia's economic security and thus damages America's ties with its allies in the region.
Middle Eastern oil is indispensable to the global economy, but in particular to countries that rely heavily on shipping and heavy industry. South Korea and Japan both fall into this category - even though Japan developed nuclear energy after the post-war reconstruction, there are certain sectors where petroleum is irreplaceable. Part of South Korea's remarkable economic growth was based on its development of petrochemical industries, obviously an enterprise where oil is a prerequisite. Mind you, both nations are practically island nations that depend heavily on shipping for import-export. Nuclear powered container ships are still in their experimental stage.
Therefore, Washington's request to significantly reduce or ban import of oil from Iran comes as a serious blow to both Seoul and Tokyo.
Some experts in Israel have waived off concerns over loss of industrial output by suggesting that South Korea simply increase imports from other Gulf emirates. Besides, they said, diffusing Iran will help the denuclearization process in North Korea.
What's absurd about all this is how little regard these "professionals" have for the intricacies of trade and commerce. Yes, some Gulf states that have historically been terrified of Iran have offered to increase exports to South Korea. But oil from Saudi Arabia does not magically appear in your local gas station the next day - this requires more ships, rerouting of ships and funds, negotiating new deals (nearly three quarters of South Korea's imports from Iran are negotiated on a long term basis and only a quarter is bought on spot price) and dozens of other infrastructural and financial consideration have to be made.
In addition, South Korea's fiscal regime keeps the Won from being overvalued - this safety mechanism, while keeping exports relatively affordable, raises the cost of imports. Escalation of tensions in the Straits of Hormuz and the expansion of sanctions against Iran will invariably affect the market. At the end of the day, South Korean industries will be still be heavily burdened even if they are supplied from different sources.
It's contemptuous to color this as a simple process, especially when one country is bending over backwards to satisfy another's irrational fears.
Furthermore, what happens in Iran will not affect North Korea. Commercial links between the two states have already ebbed long time ago due to increased policing and oversight by the international community. North Korean missiles are no longer entering Iran, but nuclear proliferation expert Joshua Pollack noted that technology transfers have continued unabated. And why point to North Korea? It's the single greatest example of how punitive sanctions don't always work.
Meanwhile, Washington has long recognized its diminishing power in the Asia-Pacific. Obama's "pivot" seeks to reassert the importance of the United States in the region - And let's be fair, no one has forgotten about the US. After all, US security guarantees to South Korea and the Seventh Fleet stationed in Japan are considered essential facets of the two countries' defenses. At the same time, US cannot revert the confluence of time. China's industrial prowess is going to inevitably make it economically influential in the region.
The Free Trade Agreement with South Korea and the Trans Pacific Partnership with Japan are two great ways for the United States to build on existing (and still massive) trade links with its allies in East Asia. Indeed, nothing solidifies a relationship between two countries more than the transfer of goods and peoples. Add ideals and sense of familiarity - the United States is still indispensable in every way imaginable.
How do you mess this up? Force your allies to swallow bitter medicine for a sickness they don't have.
Chinese premier Wen Jiaobao stepped in with good timing and suggested taking the Iranian issue to the UN. He opposed Iran's nuclear program, but he also noted the incredible hardship that will be wrought on the world if the sanctions expanded. It's a bad day when Beijing appears like the more rational actor. Make no mistake, Seoul and Tokyo are in part holding out for China to forestall the current crisis.
If the United States truly feels as though there is a need for a strategic refocusing in the Asia-Pacific, then Washington must take into greater consideration the interests and concerns of South Korea and Japan.
In fact, an American president must learn to better empathize with countries around the world in general. Wakimura Yoshitaro believed that powerful Western nations will never negotiate with, but merely dictate to Middle Eastern countries, creating conditions for simmering anger to one day boil over and scald the rest of the world. Time for the United States to step up and prove itself to be a better country than those from another era.
Read my less rambunctious article here
Monday, December 12, 2011
US misses its cue in Pacific theater
In its posture over Asia-Pacific, the United States acts as if preparing for a new protracted Cold War to contain Beijing, but its rationale demonstrates a crude failure to discern that China is no longer ruled by the People's Liberation Army alone. In fact, Washington appears to be forcing Beijing's hand by increasing its military presence, which will strengthen the very group the US does not wish to see in power.
You can read my full article here
You can read my full article here
Thursday, October 20, 2011
China's stagnation, not an option
China's focus on redistributing wealth ignores a political stagnation more threatening to long-term success. The new leadership in 2012 faces tough choices on the state's monopoly, the environment and relations with the United States - issues that will largely determine the nation's prosperity.
You can read my full article here
You can read my full article here
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)