The gradual integration of Asia's diverse economies will bring improvements in certain parts of their economies - and carry risks that existing disparities will widen. Food security must be at the forefront of such concerns. (August 2, 2012)
read the rest of the article at Asia Times
Showing posts with label food crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label food crisis. Show all posts
Friday, August 3, 2012
Thursday, June 28, 2012
Notes on starvation
Stories of famine and starvation in North Korea are making their way across world newspapers as the release of the United Nations' "Overview of Needs and Assistance" report in May coincided with new accounts of devastation in the country's grain-basket provinces. One thing is clear: North Korea is not once again falling into a food crisis - because that would imply that the country had evaded food shortage at some point in the past two decades. Based on the best estimates, the system appears to be perpetually suffering shortfalls and frequently dipping into a major humanitarian crisis whenever it is brushed by the slightest external pressure: last time it was flooding, this time drought. While the acquisition of food itself remains the key effort in allaying the issue, additional problems exist that significantly further or act as the outright cause of the crisis. Without taking a more holistic approach to this ongoing problem, the situation on the ground will not improve.
read the article here
read the article here
Sunday, June 17, 2012
New blog on North Korea
I am launching a new blog with my friend and analyst Scott LaFoy on the food situation in North Korea. I will continue updating this blog because I will still be writing about much more than the famine in North Korea - but for those looking for a good blog that will keep them informed about the humanitarian crisis in the DPRK, I hope you will frequent our new blog.
DPRK Food Aid Blog
DPRK Food Aid Blog
Friday, January 13, 2012
Why not rice?
With the food-for-nukes talks underway between the North Koreans and the US, the negotiations appear to be bogged down on the details of the food aid package. The North Korean delegation has agreed to discuss ending the uranium enrichment program if the US shows "willingness to establish confidence."
So far, Washington remains quite unwilling to build the kind of "confidence" the North Koreans are talking about - mainly providing the remaining 300,000 tons of food aid that was promised to Pyongyang in 2008. The US is offering nutritional assistance (specifically protein-high supplements targeting younger children suffering malnutrition) instead because it fears that a substantial food aid package will be diverted to the military instead of going to the people in need.
This is a reasonable concern to have considering the number of times that Pyongyang had retracted its promises to Washington and the international community. However, if the US is willing to go as far as provide nutritional assistance, then it should consider and study the effects of providing North Korea with actual food aid, including rice and other grains.
Injecting the food deficient market with valuable rice could potentially play a crucial role in redistributing the food stuffs in the country. If the food aid actually reaches those in need, then the people can either consume it or sell the valuable grains for more quantities of less valuable grains, increasing their food reserve. And so far, based on reports from South Korean, US and UN aid groups, the North Korean government has shown capable of honestly distributing food aid to its people in the past year.
However, even if the grains are siphoned off by the party and military elites, the decrease in the demand for grains by the elites may help control the food prices that are growing out of control. Specifically, the sudden availability of rice will decrease the demand and price of cheaper grains such as corn and increase their accessibility to more impoverished North Koreans who have long relied on cheaper non-rice alternatives in times of hardship. Therefore, providing real food aid should be seriously considered as a means of significantly influencing the DPRK domestic food market.
All of this is purely guesswork and could very well make no sense whatsoever in the trained eyes of an economist or those with more up-to-date information about the economic conditions in North Korea. But I hope someone somewhere in the state department (or the White House) went through at least brain storming this before quietly excluding it from US foreign policy.
There are obvious political consideration involved, but again, the cost of a broken society will only be a future burden for the international community when North Korea finally collapses (whenever that may be...)
So far, Washington remains quite unwilling to build the kind of "confidence" the North Koreans are talking about - mainly providing the remaining 300,000 tons of food aid that was promised to Pyongyang in 2008. The US is offering nutritional assistance (specifically protein-high supplements targeting younger children suffering malnutrition) instead because it fears that a substantial food aid package will be diverted to the military instead of going to the people in need.
This is a reasonable concern to have considering the number of times that Pyongyang had retracted its promises to Washington and the international community. However, if the US is willing to go as far as provide nutritional assistance, then it should consider and study the effects of providing North Korea with actual food aid, including rice and other grains.
Injecting the food deficient market with valuable rice could potentially play a crucial role in redistributing the food stuffs in the country. If the food aid actually reaches those in need, then the people can either consume it or sell the valuable grains for more quantities of less valuable grains, increasing their food reserve. And so far, based on reports from South Korean, US and UN aid groups, the North Korean government has shown capable of honestly distributing food aid to its people in the past year.
However, even if the grains are siphoned off by the party and military elites, the decrease in the demand for grains by the elites may help control the food prices that are growing out of control. Specifically, the sudden availability of rice will decrease the demand and price of cheaper grains such as corn and increase their accessibility to more impoverished North Koreans who have long relied on cheaper non-rice alternatives in times of hardship. Therefore, providing real food aid should be seriously considered as a means of significantly influencing the DPRK domestic food market.
All of this is purely guesswork and could very well make no sense whatsoever in the trained eyes of an economist or those with more up-to-date information about the economic conditions in North Korea. But I hope someone somewhere in the state department (or the White House) went through at least brain storming this before quietly excluding it from US foreign policy.
There are obvious political consideration involved, but again, the cost of a broken society will only be a future burden for the international community when North Korea finally collapses (whenever that may be...)
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
Claims and assertions... now with empirical data to boot!
Back in October, I suggested that the food crisis in North Korea is very real, not because of a definitive deficit of total food stuffs, but because of price increases in basic goods. I made the claim by piecing together ground observations and Andrei Lankov's analysis of the public distribution system, but had no empirical data to prove that the price of food was indeed increasing to unaffordable levels for everyday North Koreans.
Recently, two scholars with the Peterson Institute of International Economics have been posting articles about food and price inflation in North Korea on their blog. Marcus Noland and Stephen Haggard (the writing seems to be mostly done by Marcus Noland) collected data on rice and corn prices in the DPRK since Pyongyang's sudden currency reforms last winter. Much of their conclusions support what NGOs and UN agencies have already observed, but the empirical data that Haggard and Noland used to validate their analyses provide a definitive economic survey of the food crisis.
In the post "Inflation in North Korea," Noland observes:
Yes, there are obviously considerations in regard to "rewarding bad behavior" and whatnots. And the systemic reforms to food production and distribution in the DPRK are long ways away from being implemented, if they have even been planned. Regardless, if the first world nations do not come to the aid of North Korea now, we will be condemning millions to unfathomable suffering and death.
There are certainly more eloquent ways to say this, but: think of the children.
Recently, two scholars with the Peterson Institute of International Economics have been posting articles about food and price inflation in North Korea on their blog. Marcus Noland and Stephen Haggard (the writing seems to be mostly done by Marcus Noland) collected data on rice and corn prices in the DPRK since Pyongyang's sudden currency reforms last winter. Much of their conclusions support what NGOs and UN agencies have already observed, but the empirical data that Haggard and Noland used to validate their analyses provide a definitive economic survey of the food crisis.
In the post "Inflation in North Korea," Noland observes:
A simple regression of the prices (technically their logarithmic values) against time suggests that since the beginning of 2010, inflation on an annualized basis has averaged 131 percent for rice and 138 percent for corn... Most worrisome, however are recent post-harvest observations. Unlike 2010 when, as would be expected, the price of rice fell after the harvest, the rice price has been rising continuously since the harvest. Corn prices, which tend to fall even more dramatically after the harvest, for example by nearly 50% in the three months following the harvest in 2010, have actually risen since the harvest.further explicating what their findings actually mean, Noland continues in the post "The food situation in North Korea"
Abundant evidence suggests that the distribution of income in North Korea is becoming less equal. The upshot, as the WFP report makes clear, is that some swath of the non-elite population is being squeezed, with a reported 50-100% increase in hospital admissions of malnourished children and rising numbers of low birth-weight babies.So, with all this analysis available and understanding the social and political hazards of allowing the starvation to continue, it's mind boggling how Washington can maintain its rhetoric on the need to "identify and complete an assessment of whether food aid assistance can effectively be provided in a manner that is transparent and targeted and reaches intended beneficiaries and avoids the risk of graft and misappropriation” in the face of such a catastrophe.
Yes, there are obviously considerations in regard to "rewarding bad behavior" and whatnots. And the systemic reforms to food production and distribution in the DPRK are long ways away from being implemented, if they have even been planned. Regardless, if the first world nations do not come to the aid of North Korea now, we will be condemning millions to unfathomable suffering and death.
There are certainly more eloquent ways to say this, but: think of the children.
Monday, October 31, 2011
Dutch hunger and North Korea
After withholding food aid to North Korea since 2009, the United States plans to resume staggered delivery following last week's nuclear talks while South Korea refuses to relent. The allies' hard line has not only handed Pyongyang a propaganda card, it also ignores long-term effects of starvation - as evident from the Netherlands' 1944-1945 famine - that could hinder political change.
You can read my full article here
You can read my full article here
Thursday, October 27, 2011
Summary of North Korean Food Aid Debate in October 2011
October 6
Unification Minister Yu Woo-ik told an annual parliamentary audit of his ministry in charge of relations with North Korea that the North's rice crop did appear to be falling a little short of the average, but said "I don't think (the food situation) is very serious," without elaborating further or giving any figures.
October 7
State Department spokesperson claims that the US is still evaluating North Korea’s needs. The statement outlines US concerns that “the aid provided not only by the United States but by the international community went into regime hands rather than into the hands of hungry people.” Calls for better monitoring system.
October 13
Jim White, vice president of operations at Mercy Corps, and Matt Ellingson, director of program development at Samaritan’s Purse, reported that they were very satisfied with monitoring and oversight of the food aid. This conclusion was drawn from their weeklong trip in the provinces of North Hwanghae, South Hwanghae and Kangwon, the region that was most severely hit by monsoon-strength storms this summer.
October 17
Valerie Amos, a U.N. undersecretary-general, arrived Monday in Pyongyang, where she said she plans to hold talks with officials on long-range plans for meeting the country's food needs.
October 21
Valerie Amos said Friday that 6 million North Koreans, particularly children, mothers and pregnant women, need help.
Amos said she'd been given rare access to a government public distribution center, where rations that have fallen from 21 ounces (600 grams) a day to 7 ounces (200 grams) a day per person are handed out, as well as to a private market where more nutritious food is available at prices far beyond the means of most North Koreans.
October 23
Amos insisted that responsibility for solving repeated food crises lay with North Korea’s government and its need to tackle the underlying causes of poor agricultural production.
October 24
Valerie Amos told reporters in Seoul that the core principle with respect to humanitarian aid was that it should not be politicized.
Amos said the North has endured a "food gap" of about 1 million tonnes out of a total food requirement of 5.3 million tonnes for the past few years.
DPRK vice foreign minister Kim Kye-gwan meets with Bosworth in Geneva.
October 25
North Korea has invited a coalition of South Korean non-governmental groups to visit the DPRK. Park Hyun-seok, secretary general of the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCNK) that comprises more than 50 groups, said coalition representatives were invited to Pyongyang to discuss overall issues from Wednesday to Saturday.
Seoul, which must approve travel to the DPRK, denied the request, citing a lack of monitoring.
US State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said no decision on the food assistance had been made, adding that the issue will be strictly separated from the North's nuclear development programs.
In addition, the State Department rejects the notion that the US is holding up its decision on food aid for political or policy reasons.
Furthermore, it clarified that potential food aid to Somalia did not conflict with the possibility of providing food aid to the DPRK.
October 26
The US government is reportedly preparing to resume food aid to North Korea, but will stagger the aid in a series of deliveries.
A source close to the North has told Yonhap News that Washington plans to restart the humanitarian assistance that stalled in 2008 amid uncertainties over the rightful distribution of 170-thousand out of the pledged 500-thousand tons of food.
No significant breakthroughs in denuclearization talks between the DPRK and US in Geneva
Unification Minister Yu Woo-ik told an annual parliamentary audit of his ministry in charge of relations with North Korea that the North's rice crop did appear to be falling a little short of the average, but said "I don't think (the food situation) is very serious," without elaborating further or giving any figures.
October 7
State Department spokesperson claims that the US is still evaluating North Korea’s needs. The statement outlines US concerns that “the aid provided not only by the United States but by the international community went into regime hands rather than into the hands of hungry people.” Calls for better monitoring system.
October 13
Jim White, vice president of operations at Mercy Corps, and Matt Ellingson, director of program development at Samaritan’s Purse, reported that they were very satisfied with monitoring and oversight of the food aid. This conclusion was drawn from their weeklong trip in the provinces of North Hwanghae, South Hwanghae and Kangwon, the region that was most severely hit by monsoon-strength storms this summer.
October 17
Valerie Amos, a U.N. undersecretary-general, arrived Monday in Pyongyang, where she said she plans to hold talks with officials on long-range plans for meeting the country's food needs.
October 21
Valerie Amos said Friday that 6 million North Koreans, particularly children, mothers and pregnant women, need help.
Amos said she'd been given rare access to a government public distribution center, where rations that have fallen from 21 ounces (600 grams) a day to 7 ounces (200 grams) a day per person are handed out, as well as to a private market where more nutritious food is available at prices far beyond the means of most North Koreans.
October 23
Amos insisted that responsibility for solving repeated food crises lay with North Korea’s government and its need to tackle the underlying causes of poor agricultural production.
October 24
Valerie Amos told reporters in Seoul that the core principle with respect to humanitarian aid was that it should not be politicized.
Amos said the North has endured a "food gap" of about 1 million tonnes out of a total food requirement of 5.3 million tonnes for the past few years.
DPRK vice foreign minister Kim Kye-gwan meets with Bosworth in Geneva.
October 25
North Korea has invited a coalition of South Korean non-governmental groups to visit the DPRK. Park Hyun-seok, secretary general of the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCNK) that comprises more than 50 groups, said coalition representatives were invited to Pyongyang to discuss overall issues from Wednesday to Saturday.
Seoul, which must approve travel to the DPRK, denied the request, citing a lack of monitoring.
US State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said no decision on the food assistance had been made, adding that the issue will be strictly separated from the North's nuclear development programs.
In addition, the State Department rejects the notion that the US is holding up its decision on food aid for political or policy reasons.
Furthermore, it clarified that potential food aid to Somalia did not conflict with the possibility of providing food aid to the DPRK.
October 26
The US government is reportedly preparing to resume food aid to North Korea, but will stagger the aid in a series of deliveries.
A source close to the North has told Yonhap News that Washington plans to restart the humanitarian assistance that stalled in 2008 amid uncertainties over the rightful distribution of 170-thousand out of the pledged 500-thousand tons of food.
No significant breakthroughs in denuclearization talks between the DPRK and US in Geneva
Wednesday, October 5, 2011
Food before politics on North Korea
While the United States indulges in months of scruples over feeding North Korea, basic economic principles suggest widespread starvation and malnutrition are real. As the clock ticks, Washington should perhaps consider that the potentially ruinous burdens of demographic disintegration and insurmountable health problems could make relenting to food aid a farsighted decision.
You can read my full article here
You can read my full article here
Sunday, October 2, 2011
Brief on the dire need for food aid in the DPRK
Mistrust of the other party’s true intentions often underscores the negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. Thus it is to no one’s surprise that the United States is approaching the food crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with extreme caution and hesitation. However, conditions this year appear too dire for the US State Department to wait for Pyongyang to commit to substantive changes in its military posture before supplying everyday North Koreans with humanitarian assistance.
2011 has been without a doubt a difficult year for the Korean Peninsula. The winter had been one of the coldest in 66 years and the rainfall in July had been one of the largest in the past 100 years; a double blow for the already struggling North Korean agriculture industry.
Members from US aid organizations such as Mercy Corp, World Vision, Samaritan’s Purse, Global Resource Services and Christian Friends of Korea visited three North Korean provinces in February of this year and assessed that severe winter conditions had frozen nearly half of all the country’s winter crops. In addition, the group witnessed and documented cases of acute malnutrition and other hunger-induced health problems among the children. That was February, before heavy flooding in July struck the southern provinces of North Korea and washed away 600,000 hectares of the country’s “rice bowl.”
The World Food Program (WFP) reported in September that cases of children being admitted to hospitals for malnutrition has substantially risen and estimated that a third of all children under the age of five are severely malnourished. Furthermore, the lack of clean drinking water and other basic sanitation systems have led to widespread diarrhea and skin diseases. US-based NGOs reported that the daily rations for individuals in certain areas of the country have dropped as low as 150 grams of potato per person.
Meanwhile, concerned with the possibility of Pyongyang either diverting the aid to its military or hoarding the supplies for the celebration of Kim Il Sung’s centennial, Washington refused to provide any food assistance until Pyongyang also offers satisfactory transparency in their distribution system.
In August, despite both the European Union and the Russian Federation committing food aid to North Korea, the United States continued to delay its decision by suggesting that Pyongyang should reengage with the world to establish long term food security first. On August 18, the State Department finally offered $900,000 in flood assistance, but specified that the aid package will not include any food. Samaritan’s Purse returned to North Korea to deliver the non-food goods in early September.
Samaritan’s Purse returned from North Korea with new documented evidence of exacerbated health conditions of the malnourished youth in many parts of the country. Despite the evidence presented by the WFP and NGOs over the past seven months, Washington remains in deliberation over the appropriate course of action. This remains the case after the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, a South Korean NGO delivering food aid to North Korea, was allowed to not only oversee distribution of foodstuffs to flood victims but also videotape the process in early August.
The United States cannot forever withhold food aid to the North Koreans without further linking food aid to political aims, something that the US State Department disavowed as its policy time after time. Robert King, US special envoy for North Korean human-rights issues, emphasized this point when he said that "the United States policy is that … we provide assistance, humanitarian assistance... based on need and [not on] political consideration." Washington should stand by its stated principles.
2011 has been without a doubt a difficult year for the Korean Peninsula. The winter had been one of the coldest in 66 years and the rainfall in July had been one of the largest in the past 100 years; a double blow for the already struggling North Korean agriculture industry.
Members from US aid organizations such as Mercy Corp, World Vision, Samaritan’s Purse, Global Resource Services and Christian Friends of Korea visited three North Korean provinces in February of this year and assessed that severe winter conditions had frozen nearly half of all the country’s winter crops. In addition, the group witnessed and documented cases of acute malnutrition and other hunger-induced health problems among the children. That was February, before heavy flooding in July struck the southern provinces of North Korea and washed away 600,000 hectares of the country’s “rice bowl.”
The World Food Program (WFP) reported in September that cases of children being admitted to hospitals for malnutrition has substantially risen and estimated that a third of all children under the age of five are severely malnourished. Furthermore, the lack of clean drinking water and other basic sanitation systems have led to widespread diarrhea and skin diseases. US-based NGOs reported that the daily rations for individuals in certain areas of the country have dropped as low as 150 grams of potato per person.
Meanwhile, concerned with the possibility of Pyongyang either diverting the aid to its military or hoarding the supplies for the celebration of Kim Il Sung’s centennial, Washington refused to provide any food assistance until Pyongyang also offers satisfactory transparency in their distribution system.
In August, despite both the European Union and the Russian Federation committing food aid to North Korea, the United States continued to delay its decision by suggesting that Pyongyang should reengage with the world to establish long term food security first. On August 18, the State Department finally offered $900,000 in flood assistance, but specified that the aid package will not include any food. Samaritan’s Purse returned to North Korea to deliver the non-food goods in early September.
Samaritan’s Purse returned from North Korea with new documented evidence of exacerbated health conditions of the malnourished youth in many parts of the country. Despite the evidence presented by the WFP and NGOs over the past seven months, Washington remains in deliberation over the appropriate course of action. This remains the case after the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, a South Korean NGO delivering food aid to North Korea, was allowed to not only oversee distribution of foodstuffs to flood victims but also videotape the process in early August.
The United States cannot forever withhold food aid to the North Koreans without further linking food aid to political aims, something that the US State Department disavowed as its policy time after time. Robert King, US special envoy for North Korean human-rights issues, emphasized this point when he said that "the United States policy is that … we provide assistance, humanitarian assistance... based on need and [not on] political consideration." Washington should stand by its stated principles.
Friday, September 23, 2011
The importance of being earnest
North Korea would never abolish nuclear weapons as they are seen as pillars of the military state, but the United States stubbornly sticks to demands of complete denuclearization while withholding food aid. Rather than constantly indulging in hardline rhetoric, Washington could purse the more realistic goals of ensuring non-proliferation and appealing to Pyongyang's better-dressed, cell phone-carrying progeny.
You can read my full article here
You can read my full article here
Monday, September 19, 2011
Summary of North Korean Food Aid Debate in August 2011
August 2
The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, a South Korean NGO, sent 300 tons of flour aid to North Korea.
August 3
South Korea offered $4.7 million in medical supplies and other necessities for flood relief; however, additional request for building materials in aid was rejected by Seoul. Representatives from the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation begin their visit to Sariwon to monitor the distribution of aid dispatched from South Korea.
August 4
Deputy spokesperson Mark Toner stated that the U.S. is still assessing “whether [US] can provide food assistance [to North Korea] in a way that’s consistent with [US] policy.” Flood aid was supposedly not being considered during the August 4 press briefing
August 9
The EU donated 200,000 Euros in flood aid. The new aid comes in addition to the food aid worth 10 million Euros sent by the EU in July.
August 10
Senior South Korean official noted North Korea’s food situation is not that serious compared to previous years
August 11
State Department spokesperson noted although the United States may provide food aid, the North Korean regime still holds "primary responsibility" for feeding its people in the long term. The spokesperson also noted that better relations were necessary for greater cooperation in food security and the “best route would be back to engagement with the international community, which would allow trade and allow an open system”
August 15
State department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said that South Korea’s decision to provide food aid was a sovereign decision, implying that Washington and Seoul are not on the same page
August 18
US offered $900,000 in emergency flood assistance to North Korea. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said "It includes things like plastic sheeting, tents," but would not include food, which is being “internally reviewed.”
Meanwhile, ROK ministry of Unification announced that The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation submitted a video it recorded from Aug. 3-6 of North Koreans distributing South Korean food aid to its people.
August 20
The first shipment of 3,560 metric tons of milling wheat arrived in North Korea from Russia. Russia’s United Grain plans to deliver 50,000 tons of wheat from ports in Vladivostok and Novorossiysk.
August 20
Kim Jong Il arrived in Russia to attend a meeting with President Medvedev.
August 22
North Korean Red Cross made an emergency appeal for £ 2.7 million. At the same time, North Korea ordered all 14 South Korean workers at Geumgang resort to leave and said it would scrap all South Korean assets in the region.
August 24
During his meeting with President Medvedev in Ulan Ude, Kim Jong Il promised to work on introducing a moratorium on testing and spent nuclear fuel processing. Senior Washington official said that the offer was “welcome but ... insufficient” to return to the negotiating tables.
September
No notable discussion on North Korean food aid.
The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, a South Korean NGO, sent 300 tons of flour aid to North Korea.
August 3
South Korea offered $4.7 million in medical supplies and other necessities for flood relief; however, additional request for building materials in aid was rejected by Seoul. Representatives from the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation begin their visit to Sariwon to monitor the distribution of aid dispatched from South Korea.
August 4
Deputy spokesperson Mark Toner stated that the U.S. is still assessing “whether [US] can provide food assistance [to North Korea] in a way that’s consistent with [US] policy.” Flood aid was supposedly not being considered during the August 4 press briefing
August 9
The EU donated 200,000 Euros in flood aid. The new aid comes in addition to the food aid worth 10 million Euros sent by the EU in July.
August 10
Senior South Korean official noted North Korea’s food situation is not that serious compared to previous years
August 11
State Department spokesperson noted although the United States may provide food aid, the North Korean regime still holds "primary responsibility" for feeding its people in the long term. The spokesperson also noted that better relations were necessary for greater cooperation in food security and the “best route would be back to engagement with the international community, which would allow trade and allow an open system”
August 15
State department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said that South Korea’s decision to provide food aid was a sovereign decision, implying that Washington and Seoul are not on the same page
August 18
US offered $900,000 in emergency flood assistance to North Korea. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said "It includes things like plastic sheeting, tents," but would not include food, which is being “internally reviewed.”
Meanwhile, ROK ministry of Unification announced that The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation submitted a video it recorded from Aug. 3-6 of North Koreans distributing South Korean food aid to its people.
August 20
The first shipment of 3,560 metric tons of milling wheat arrived in North Korea from Russia. Russia’s United Grain plans to deliver 50,000 tons of wheat from ports in Vladivostok and Novorossiysk.
August 20
Kim Jong Il arrived in Russia to attend a meeting with President Medvedev.
August 22
North Korean Red Cross made an emergency appeal for £ 2.7 million. At the same time, North Korea ordered all 14 South Korean workers at Geumgang resort to leave and said it would scrap all South Korean assets in the region.
August 24
During his meeting with President Medvedev in Ulan Ude, Kim Jong Il promised to work on introducing a moratorium on testing and spent nuclear fuel processing. Senior Washington official said that the offer was “welcome but ... insufficient” to return to the negotiating tables.
September
No notable discussion on North Korean food aid.
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