Food and Asian integration

The gradual integration of Asia's diverse economies will bring improvements in certain parts of their economies - and carry risks that existing disparities will widen. Food security must be at the forefront of such concerns. (August 2, 2012)


read the rest of the article at Asia Times

East Asia faces Iran sanctions dilemma

In January, I presented the difficulty that East Asian states face when balancing their economic interests in the Middle East and their political and security needs that are intrinsically tied to the US. The issues that were relevant then has remained so throughout the year - now with increased sanctions on Iran, Washington is testing the trans-Pacific ties.

United States sanctions on Iran over Tehran's nuclear program have left South Korea and Japan juggling between satisfying domestic energy demand and keeping relations with Washington sweet. Should loopholes aimed at bypassing punitive measures that are hampering economic recovery and growth close, Tokyo and Seoul will have to re-think the post-World War II trans-Pacific relationship.

read the full article at Asia Times

Korea feels housing shock

South Korea's faltering housing market threatens to undermine broad economic growth, as construction companies struggle to find work and over-indebted homeowners and high-rent tenants curb spending, putting a squeeze on small enterprises that have no exports to fill the gap.

read the full article here

Notes on starvation

Stories of famine and starvation in North Korea are making their way across world newspapers as the release of the United Nations' "Overview of Needs and Assistance" report in May coincided with new accounts of devastation in the country's grain-basket provinces. One thing is clear: North Korea is not once again falling into a food crisis - because that would imply that the country had evaded food shortage at some point in the past two decades. Based on the best estimates, the system appears to be perpetually suffering shortfalls and frequently dipping into a major humanitarian crisis whenever it is brushed by the slightest external pressure: last time it was flooding, this time drought. While the acquisition of food itself remains the key effort in allaying the issue, additional problems exist that significantly further or act as the outright cause of the crisis. Without taking a more holistic approach to this ongoing problem, the situation on the ground will not improve.

read the article here

An Uncertain Future Together

A follow-up to the previous post (Prospects for a New Trading Bloc), I feel it is necessary to provide further analysis on the possible motives behind South Korea's acceptance of the joint declaration which underscored the possibility of forming a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA). This new position is different from the more skeptical position that South Korea took in December last year.

Looking at the timing of Seoul's negotiations with its neighbors, economic benefits from closer regional economic integration appear to be only one of the many objectives that President Lee Myungbak had under consideration. Although the finalization of the agreement between Seoul and Tokyo was recently put on hold, a bilateral agreement on sharing military intelligence and logistics was in its final stage before the trilateral negotiations began. Immediately following the summit in Beijing, South Korea approached China about establishing a similar arrangement. The timing of these meetings should be read as an expression of Seoul's foreign policy objectives.

It is likely that President Lee is attempting to achieve a definitive foreign policy victory before his term ends. The biggest challenge to Lee was not just the two North Korean attacks in 2010, but also the meek response he received from the regional powers when he sought to reprimand Pyongyang. In particular, China's lukewarm response has been blamed for encouraging North Korea to continue provocative actions along the Northern Limitation Line. Preventing future attacks will require establishing a diplomatic environment in the region that would deter North Korea from behaving belligerently - with China enthusiastic about the trilateral FTA, Seoul may be hoping to use it as leverage to more closely align Beijing to South Korea's interests.

Despite the efforts, China is unlikely to change its position on North Korea in the near future, especially when the Chinese Communist Party is preparing for its power transition later this year. Furthermore, China needs North Korea to resource the necessary raw materials for the development of the northeastern provinces.

This should also provide a stark reminder to the United States that some of South Korea's needs can only be satisfied by Chinese cooperation. Events this April proved that the United States can only do so much to convince the North Koreans not to do something. With this in mind, there is little reason to brashly pursue policy that will bring the two countries even closer together.  

Please read my article on Asia Times Online

Putin’s Return to the Wild East

During a Russian Federation Security Council meeting in December 2006, the presidential envoy to the Russian Far East suggested creating a commission subordinate to the prime minister which would oversee all development projects in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. Last month, the Economic Development Ministry drafted a bill that will establish a state corporation authorized to distribute licenses for mineral extraction in 16 administrative zones. Nicknamed the “Far Eastern Republic,” the corporation will be partially exempt from federal legislation, receive massive tax breaks, operate outside regional state control, and receive shares of other state companies as investment.

The idea behind the “Far Eastern Republic” is similar to the 2006 proposal - only this time the project is subordinate to the president who will have the power to appoint the head of the company and name the supervisory board. This constant proposal to present special economic authority to Putin (who would have been in charge of the project in 2008 as premier) represents a clear indication that Vladimir Vladimirovich is heavily invested in the development of the Far East. Indeed, he probably recognizes that domestic support for his administration rides on continued economic growth. For that to occur, Russia must tap into the vast natural resource reserves beneath its most underdeveloped regions.

Alongside exports to China, Russia has also opened up export opportunities to Japan and the Koreas. Earlier this month, Democratic Party of Japan policy chief Seiji Maehara and Alexander Medvedev, Vice President of Gazprom, agreed to study the possibility of laying a gas pipeline linking Hokkaido and Sakhalin Islands.

With all these opportunities, the biggest obstacle to Russia's development in the Far East will be the heavy handed involvement of the state in the region. The "Far Eastern Republic" is being heavily criticized by Russia's former finance minister Alexei Kudrin who recognizes that

the creation of such a market player capable of implementing any private project, considering the state's administrative resource and [special preferences], means that any other investor in this area must be aware that another player with special preferences, special administrative resources and special access to finances may come to the market at any moment

A supporter of privatization, Kudrin believes that Moscow's current policies are damaging to the investment climate in the country.

Indeed given the opportunity, enterprises in Russia appear ready to invest in assets in the Russian Far East. For example, when Vanino seaport in Khabarovsk Krai was privatized in May 2011, 73% stake in the seaport was bought for 10.8 billion rubles ($354 million) after the bid started at 934 million rubles ($30.6 million). Although the winning company is currently undergoing trial resulting from its failure to make the down payment on the seaport, it is an example of how much the assets in the Russian Far East are in demand.

The problem with privatization for the Kremlin is two things:

1. "Privatization" of the 1990s left a bad reputation for entrepreneurship; the Russian people only remember economic downfall, oligarchs and corruption - the Putin administration came to power in 2000 with the goal of cleaning up the socio-economic ramifications of the Yeltsin era, thus  openly endorsing privatization for the Far East is politically difficult
2. Privatization would mean letting go of control over major companies. This will in the short term decrease government revenue

Putin is intent on spearheading development in the Far East; however, beyond building some infrastructure in Vladivostok, the Russian state will not be able to sustain its investments in the region. President Medvedev’s administration had taken small steps towards lessening state control over energy companies, but Putin is unlikely to continue these policies with the "Far Eastern Republic."

While Putin will undoubtedly remain closely engaged in the Far East during his 6-year term, the efforts to develop the Russian Far East have already been sullied by heavy state control over the project. If Moscow desires a prosperous future for the Russian people, it really must consider a more effective and efficient means of access its mineral wealth.

Read my article on Asia Times Online

How to tango with Pyongyang

New evidence unearthed by the North Korea International Documentation Project suggests that the 1968 hijacking of the USS Pueblo and the dramatic increase in violence between 1967 and 1968 were motivated by Pyongyang's desires to mend ties with Beijing. According to Romanian sources, Kim Il Sung believed that following Mao's anti-US strategy of opening a "second front" on the Korean Peninsula would bring much needed aid and supplies to the DPRK from the PRC.

This new interpretation of the Pueblo Crisis would remain consistent with how North Korea suddenly changed its behavior towards South Korea (despite maintaining hostile intentions) when China began its rapprochement with the US.

The new narrative of the Pueblo Crisis characterizes Pyongyang as malleable and responding to international conditions, running counter to how many have implicitly portrayed the state.

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Jennifer Lind forwarded three elements that facilitate North Korea's deterrent capabilities:

• unpredictability 
• the catastrophic consequences of North Korea’s collapse
• the regime’s nuclear capabilities.

While Professor Lind is correct to pin point North Korea's strengths, she provides no policy recommendation for Washington in the article because she is unconvinced of Pyongyang's responsiveness to external pressures. From Lind's perspective North Korea's history of provocations from USS Pueblo to the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 is a single narrative of a state acting without a long-term strategy.

However, the new Romanian evidence on the Pueblo Crisis challenges this view.

If North Korea does indeed react to outside forces, then it is likely to want, first and foremost, to reduce its overwhelming insecurity. This may create an opportunity for Washington to work with - Ambassador Morton Abramowitz suggested dispatching a senior-level politician (like the VP) to negotiate trading security, recognition, etc. for Pyongyang's missiles and nukes.

Alternatively the US could do nothing and see the entire region descend into paranoia and North Korean children starve to death. Washington ought to take the step to change the region for good.

Read my slightly less hyperbolic article on Asia Times Online

End of an Era?

Tokyo is mobilizing for the upcoming North Korean launch with forwardness and confidence that is rarely seen in Japanese foreign policy. It is very possible that this is an indicator of the changing status quo in the Asia-Pacific: Japan is breaking from its Cold War-era role as a dependent state of the United States and making it on its own.

3 days before South Korea's befuddled officials announced their possible response to the rocket, Japan insisted with vigor that it would shoot down the rocket if it strayed into Japanese airspace. This announcement is somewhat shocking when you consider Article 9 of the Japanese constitution:

ARTICLE 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

During the Cold War, this law and the corresponding foreign policy doctrine (The Yoshida Doctrine) presented one of the best examples of the peace dividend. Tokyo was able to rehabilitate its international status and mend relations with victims of Japanese imperialism while receiving protection from the United States. Reconstruction of a bombed-out country is much easier when the government focuses entirely on the economy.

But the maintenance of the Yoshida Doctrine was always tenuous because it was not entirely rooted in the ideals of pacifism. On the contrary, this peace-loving policy was a cold and calculated maneuver that maximized gains both domestically and abroad. PM Shigeru Yoshida was able to satisfy both the left and right by institutionalizing neutrality while de facto remaining dependent on the US military. It was a brilliant political compromise to jump-start a shamed and defeated country.

So what has changed?

A lot of people are suggesting that it's China and its claims on Senkaku that has driven the Japanese to increase its focus on the military. But threats to Japan have always been present - 30 years ago it was the Soviet Union.

If we put the world of PM Yoshida and PM Yoshihiko Noda next to each other, one crucial difference becomes very evident: the decline of the US.

Japan slowly began rearming itself in the 1990s because of demands from Washington for Tokyo to be more engaged in regional security and Japan half-heartedly went down that route. Now "regional security" is not just an ambiguous term: Japan's security doctrine has completely shifted from home island defense to far-island defense. It plans to add 2 more Hyuga-class helicopter carriers and purchase American F-35 fighters (with vertical landing and liftoff capabilities), which would effectively equip the Japanese Self-Defense Force with 4 aircraft carriers. Last year, Tokyo even removed the self-imposed ban on arms exports, making way for the military-industrial complex to grow.

What Tokyo and other governments in Asia see is the increasing powerlessness of the United States before its own massive internal problems, both political and economic. For instance, Bruce Klinger notes:

The new defense strategy could prevent the U.S. from fulfilling its existing treaty requirements. For example, the current war plan responding to a North Korean invasion (OPLAN 5027) calls for the U.S. to deploy 690,000 ground troops, 160 destroyers, and 2,000 aircraft within 90 days. Doing so would require the entire U.S. Army and Marine Corps after the budget cuts. The Obama Administration should make clear to South Korea that future U.S. force levels will not support the current war plan.

No wonder the Japanese are rearming themselves - with Asia unstable as always with North Korean provocations and Chinese assertiveness, and with the US increasingly unable to fulfill its role as defender, Tokyo sees few options outside militarization. On top of that, unlike the 1940s and 50s, the economy is fairing better than people think it is.

While policymakers in Washington cheer Japan's increasing aggressiveness, few have raised the point that Tokyo's policies may be more of an indicator of American weakness.

The implications of Japan becoming a military force in the region are grave. There are ever-increasing tensions over the South China Sea and adding more robust military players into the region may not be a good solution. In addition, North Korea's response to Tokyo's militarization could also have some serious ramifications.

All in all, Northeast Asia is in for a rocky decade.

Check out my article on Asia Times Online

Why we must go on... even with Pyongyang

The hard-won deal with North Korea is already in peril - Pyongyang has announced its intentions to launch a satellite to commemorate Kim Il Sung's centennial and the US sees this as a violation of the moratorium on missile testing. Nonetheless, the negotiations must go on because the opportunity is ripe to set Northeast Asia on a course for greater stability.

Evaluating the merit of the recent food-for-nukes deal has divided analysts.

In a Washington Post op-ed on March 8, Andrew Natsios censured the "Leap-day Deal" for sending a message that encourages Pyongyang to build more nukes and divert aid with impunity. Chris Nelson criticized Natsios' positions but failed to produce a defense for the deal itself.

I am in favor of the deal and here are reasons why:

The moratorium on activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility is a great start and if the US stays in the agreement, there will be follow-up negotiations. Some analysts were critical of the fact that the deal narrowly specified the Yongbyon facility when there are probably other underground nuclear facilities. But we cannot monitor facilities that we do not know about, thus a more expansive agreement would have simply acted as a harbinger for future conflict.

Based on accounts of high-profile defectors from North Korea, it is likely that Pyongyang is actually concerned for the wellbeing of the North Korean people (in so far as not wanting them to all die) - this will bring North Korea back to the negotiating table because Washington's nutritional assistance package of 240,000 tons will not be sufficient to ensure food security through the lean months between harvests. When negotiations restart, there is room to expand upon the standing agreement.

Monitoring, which State Department officials and many analysts mention on a regular basis as a key obstacle to providing food aid, has never been a big problem - not because Pyongyang doesn't siphon off the aid that comes in the country, but because having surplus food in the market will have a positive outcome. As Chris Green assessed in his recent article on Sino-NK:

This is one oft-unspoken fact that muddies the waters of the 'aid transparency debate'; namely, that giving grain to the North Korean state ends up diluting prices in the [markets], something that is good for ordinary consumers

More importantly, it is in the moral and strategic interests of the United States to help build a North Korea that is not suffering from chronic malnutrition. The long term social consequences of exposure to starvation will prevent the North Korean people from engaging in activities that contribute to social change or effectively participate in reconstruction if the country opens up to the world. If this occurs, then the cost of reconstruction falls on South Korea and invariably the United States. Therefore, Washington should begin investing in the future that it wants to see today.

Negotiations must not only go on, but pick up the pace. As North Korea's economic and political ties with China and the Russian Federation deepen, Washington's economic importance to Pyongyang will diminish. More importantly, should Washington leave North Korea without means to better secure and distribute food, the consequences will yield an immense human cost that will continue to undermine the region's stability long into the future.

Read my full article on Asia Times

The dependency illusion

Through trial and extreme error, communism has been thoroughly discredited in the last century; however, the theory of dialectical materialism survives into the new millennium. Marx suggested that the construction of new means of production inevitably leads to internal contradictions and new epochs are created through the process of synthesizing all the existing material realities. Today, we simply replaced the idea of an inevitable communist takeover with the presumption that every country will one day adopt the liberal democratic system.

This was Francis Fukuyama's famous thesis in "The End of History?" However, the revolt against this new world order began soon after the end of the Second World War, right alongside the Cold War. This was the struggle fought via economic nationalism and competing theories of modernization, taking shape in various ideologies and political systems. Latin American economists first led the charge in the 1940s and 50s with their "Dependency Theory." The core idea forwarded the view that poor and less powerful states will be subject to the political, economic, social and cultural domination of wealthier states. Adherents of this theory chose to disengage from the dominant economic systems of their world in favor of sovereignty.

There were varying degrees (everything from import substitution to self-sufficiency), but the most radical and extensive pursuit of this stance can be seen in North Korea. North Korea rejected the idea of being subject to either American or Soviet political and economic influences. Manifestations of this appeared in Pyongyang's refusal to join COMECON and its constant pursuit of heavy industry.

However, many analysts have pushed aside indigenous North Korean desire to be independent and instead analyzed Pyongyang's policies as an attempt to maximize political capital by playing the Soviet Union against the PRC during the Sino-Soviet Split. Naturally, in the post-Soviet era, the US foreign policy makers look to China as North Korea's patron and sole hegemon. As negotiations in Beijing carry on to denuclearize North Korea, this mistaken perception of Sino-DPRK relations will prove most ineffective for the US side.

North Korea appears to be increasingly dependent on Chinese economic aid and slowly making reforms to harbor cross-border trade. Some have argued that such reforms indicate North Korea's irreversible ties to China and a physical representation of Beijing's influence over Pyongyang, almost like the economic and political relationship that the US had with Latin America. However, to characterize the Sino-DPRK relationship as a traditional core-periphery model is short sighted.

The basic assumption that North Korea's economic dependence translates to political subjugation lacks substantial warrants. Yafeng Xia, a historian specializing in the history Sino-DPRK relations, portrayed China as less of a lever and more of a hammer, meaning that Beijing can strangle/starve Pyongyang to death but lacks the tools to apply less extreme changes or bring it to submission.

On top of not wishing to upset the balance of powers,North Korea serves as an important source of raw materials for development in China's northeastern provinces.

Furthermore, with everyone expecting millions of refugees to flood across the Yalu when the state collapses, it is hard to distinguish who has leverage over whom in the current state of affairs.

There is a predominant mood of inevitability when people discuss issues related to North Korea - that it will one day collapse or that it will inevitable bow to the economic realities and give themselves to the Chinese model. However, such thoughts are presumptuous and oversimplifies how different people view themselves and the world.

Imposition of dogmatism and a self-assuredness in one's own vision of history are not new things, but we ought to have learned our lesson and become more flexible.

Read my article in the context of the US-DPRK negotiations on Asia Times

The Russian Winter Offensive

It has been a while since I wrote an article about Russia, but with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s recent visit to Damascus and Russia’s veto at the UN Security Council to block a resolution on Syria, the Eurasian giant deserves our attention.

Many analysts question why Moscow is acting so strongly against the United States when the Obama Administration appears to have done so much to achieve a "Reset" with the Kremlin. Most prominently, Daniel Drezner compares Russia and China in his Foreign Policy article and points out how Beijing's rhetoric towards Washington is more reserved than Moscow's despite China facing more direct challenges from the United States.

But objectively speaking, the baseline presumption that there actually had been a "Reset" between the United States and the Russian Federation may be a fallacy. With Putin at the helm, the Kremlin has seen the foreign policies of the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations, which invariably produces a long term perspective on US behavior towards Russia and actions in Russia's key areas of interest. Taking this view into account helps better explain why Moscow may not feel that Obama is all that different from Bush.

What the Russian leadership expected the “Reset” was for the United States to break from the policy of unilateralism and show “commitment to the notion that Russia can be a viable and trustworthy partner to the United States regardless of the state of Russia’s domestic affairs.” The Libya issue provides a good example of where the "Reset" failed to manifest - Russia abstained from the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 without totally rejecting it in deference to US leadership. Despite the silent understanding that the resolution should not be viewed as a green light for military intervention, NATO began air strikes on Libya. Therefore, in debating the crisis in Syria, it is only natural for Lavrov to give a firm warning to the "West" and use Russia's veto power to reject the resolution against the Assad regime. Furthermore, the criticism against Russian elections by the US State Department was not well received by the Kremlin, especially during a sensitive time for semi-democratic/semi-authoritarian regimes around the world.

What is more, Washington has nothing to bargain for. It has opted out of being an assertive negotiator or a stabilizer on the Korean Peninsula where Russia seeks stability in order to begin constructing new gas pipelines that will open way for the development of the Russian Far East. The US has not and cannot fulfill Japan's security needs, which is forcing Tokyo to reorient its military position from north against Russia to south against China (exchanging land based forces in Hokkaido for air and naval forces in the South China Sea) and leaving Russia in good position to conclude a favorable resolution on its island dispute with Japan.

Before, Russia saw the United States as a vital partner in engaging Asian countries - but with Washington forcing South Korea and Japan to reconsider their dependency on oil imports from the Middle East, Russians  can expect the East Asian economic powers to come to the Kremlin. In fact, South Korean entities have been in negotiation since 2003 to develop means to deliver gas to South Korea through North Korea - now Pyongyang has given a nod of approval and things will move along, with or without Washington.

The US-Russian friction is a reflection of Washington's massive loss of leverage over a country that had at one point desperately desired closer relations. Internal weaknesses of the Russian Federation may play a peripheral role, but obsessing over Putin's authority over the country misses the wider implications of current events.

Russia is a big country. It spans over vast territories and borders several regions where major world players have staked out their interests - Kremlin is challenged to produce a cohesive and coherent foreign policy to maximize Russia's gains. Naturally, the resulting policies are both reactive and pragmatic.

Looking at Eurasia from the perspective of those who rule over a significant portion of it seems like a good place to start for Washington if it seeks to better assert its leadership role there.

Read my full article on Asia Times.

The Intractable Issue of Energy

As South Korea and Japan haggle over the most appropriate method of castigating Tehran for its nuclear program while also ensuring continued supply of petroleum from Iran, I think it's useful to recollect the insights of the late Japanese economist Wakimura Yoshitaro (1900-96). A member of the leftist economic circle, the Ouchi group, Wakimura warned that the transport of Middle Eastern oil was a potential flashpoint for global conflict. Having lost faith in the West's ability to negotiate without coercing oil producing countries, members of the Ouchi group concluded that continued dependence on oil and Japan's alliance with the United States would invariably pull them into an unwanted conflict surrounding the black gold. Their solution was for Japan to go nuclear.

Today both Seoul and Tokyo are struggling to balance their economic needs and their political allegiance to the United States. I argued in my most recent article on Asia Times Online that Washington's aggressive policies in the Middle East threatens East Asia's economic security and thus damages America's ties with its allies in the region.

Middle Eastern oil is indispensable to the global economy, but in particular to countries that rely heavily on shipping and heavy industry. South Korea and Japan both fall into this category - even though Japan developed nuclear energy after the post-war reconstruction, there are certain sectors where petroleum is irreplaceable. Part of South Korea's remarkable economic growth was based on its development of petrochemical industries, obviously an enterprise where oil is a prerequisite. Mind you, both nations are practically island nations that depend heavily on shipping for import-export. Nuclear powered container ships are still in their experimental stage.

Therefore, Washington's request to significantly reduce or ban import of oil from Iran comes as a serious blow to both Seoul and Tokyo.

Some experts in Israel have waived off concerns over loss of industrial output by suggesting that South Korea simply increase imports from other Gulf emirates. Besides, they said, diffusing Iran will help the denuclearization process in North Korea.

What's absurd about all this is how little regard these "professionals" have for the intricacies of trade and commerce. Yes, some Gulf states that have historically been terrified of Iran have offered to increase exports to South Korea. But oil from Saudi Arabia does not magically appear in your local gas station the next day - this requires more ships, rerouting of ships and funds, negotiating new deals (nearly three quarters of South Korea's imports from Iran are negotiated on a long term basis and only a quarter is bought on spot price) and dozens of other infrastructural and financial consideration have to be made.

In addition, South Korea's fiscal regime keeps the Won from being overvalued - this safety mechanism, while keeping exports relatively affordable, raises the cost of imports. Escalation of tensions in the Straits of Hormuz and the expansion of sanctions against Iran will invariably affect the market. At the end of the day, South Korean industries will be still be heavily burdened even if they are supplied from different sources.

It's contemptuous to color this as a simple process, especially when one country is bending over backwards to satisfy another's irrational fears.

Furthermore, what happens in Iran will not affect North Korea. Commercial links between the two states have already ebbed long time ago due to increased policing and oversight by the international community. North Korean missiles are no longer entering Iran, but nuclear proliferation expert Joshua Pollack noted that technology transfers have continued unabated. And why point to North Korea? It's the single greatest example of how punitive sanctions don't always work.

Meanwhile, Washington has long recognized its diminishing power in the Asia-Pacific. Obama's "pivot" seeks to reassert the importance of the United States in the region - And let's be fair, no one has forgotten about the US. After all, US security guarantees to South Korea and the Seventh Fleet stationed in Japan are considered essential facets of the two countries' defenses. At the same time, US cannot revert the confluence of time. China's industrial prowess is going to inevitably make it economically influential in the region.

The Free Trade Agreement with South Korea and the Trans Pacific Partnership with Japan are two great ways for the United States to build on existing (and still massive) trade links with its allies in East Asia. Indeed, nothing solidifies a relationship between two countries more than the transfer of goods and peoples. Add ideals and sense of familiarity - the United States is still indispensable in every way imaginable.

How do you mess this up? Force your allies to swallow bitter medicine for a sickness they don't have.

Chinese premier Wen Jiaobao stepped in with good timing and suggested taking the Iranian issue to the UN. He opposed Iran's nuclear program, but he also noted the incredible hardship that will be wrought on the world if the sanctions expanded. It's a bad day when Beijing appears like the more rational actor. Make no mistake, Seoul and Tokyo are in part holding out for China to forestall the current crisis.

If the United States truly feels as though there is a need for a strategic refocusing in the Asia-Pacific, then Washington must take into greater consideration the interests and concerns of South Korea and Japan.

In fact, an American president must learn to better empathize with countries around the world in general. Wakimura Yoshitaro believed that powerful Western nations will never negotiate with, but merely dictate to Middle Eastern countries, creating conditions for simmering anger to one day boil over and scald the rest of the world. Time for the United States to step up and prove itself to be a better country than those from another era.

Read my less rambunctious article here

A legacy of death and inflation

Rather than the prosperous state Pyongyang promised for Kim Il-sung's centennial celebrations in 2012, Kim Jong-il's shortsighted economic policies leave his son in a position in which Jong-il found himself in 1994 - inheriting a nation facing famine. The capital's relative luxury has indirectly caused soaring food prices and the young Kim Jung-eun is faced with the insurmountable challenge of controlling inflation.

In addition, with winter setting in, North Koreans may also have to make the difficult choice between fuel and food. If the inflationary pressures remain, vast portions of the population will starve or freeze to death by the end of the winter.

The danger lurking around the corner is the possibility of North Korea falling back on anti-Americanism to channel the public's distress away from the falling living standards. It will not be a particularly difficult task as the state propaganda apparatus has already pointed to US-led sanctions as the key source of the country's hardships.

According to some sources, Kim Il-sung engaged in provocative actions in 1968 precisely because of this: to convince the people that sacrifice was necessary for national security.

You can read my full article here

Obituary: Man of steel, Park Tae-joon

Park Tae-joon defied critics by developing South Korea's steel industry from zero into a world-beating colossus in a matter of a few years, and so embodied his country's rapid political and economic transformation in the 20th century. One of Asia's legendary industrialists, his legacy of achievement built on military discipline and brute determination will tower over generations to come.

You can read the full obituary here

US misses its cue in Pacific theater

In its posture over Asia-Pacific, the United States acts as if preparing for a new protracted Cold War to contain Beijing, but its rationale demonstrates a crude failure to discern that China is no longer ruled by the People's Liberation Army alone. In fact, Washington appears to be forcing Beijing's hand by increasing its military presence, which will strengthen the very group the US does not wish to see in power.

You can read my full article here

Japan, Korea return to nationalist roots with trade pact 'reforms'

Japan and South Korea misleadingly claim that principle and the pursuit of liberal policies lie behind reform of their international trade relations. What is happening in both cases is a readjustment of outdated policy to pursue traditional statist objectives rooted in their respective identities. More than mere economic gain, economic nationalism is still very well and alive in East Asia.

You can read my full article here

Why North Korea won't quit

Predictions that North Korea will collapse due to internal instability caused by a succession crisis ignore how Kim Jong-il took charge in a time of greater famine and international isolation than today's heir apparent. Pointing to other authoritarian states' decline is also futile, as its 20th-century colonial traumas led North Korea to build its state on one inviolable principle: retain sovereignty.

You can read my full article here

Dutch hunger and North Korea

After withholding food aid to North Korea since 2009, the United States plans to resume staggered delivery following last week's nuclear talks while South Korea refuses to relent. The allies' hard line has not only handed Pyongyang a propaganda card, it also ignores long-term effects of starvation - as evident from the Netherlands' 1944-1945 famine - that could hinder political change.

You can read my full article here

China's stagnation, not an option

China's focus on redistributing wealth ignores a political stagnation more threatening to long-term success. The new leadership in 2012 faces tough choices on the state's monopoly, the environment and relations with the United States - issues that will largely determine the nation's prosperity.

You can read my full article here

US coercive diplomacy threatens Korean war*

There are hawkish voices in Washington who are again recommending coercive measures on North Korea that envision massive military and economic might devastating Kim Jong-il's regime. However, plans to mobilize a larger South Korea army, place nuclear weapons there and engage in false-flag operations not only threaten to alienate Russia and China, they also bait the North's notorious willingness for all-out war.

You can read my full article here

*note: I did not choose this title.